6th Annual Conference of
The European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions
University of Pisa
June 10-12, 2019
Centro Congressi “Le Benedettine”, Piazza S. Paolo a Ripa D’Arno 16, Pisa, Italy

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Monday, June 10, 2019

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**FAREWELL**
Locations

Centro congressi Le Benedettine
Piazza S. Paolo a Ripa D’Arno, 16, 56125 Pisa

Conference Dinner at Ristorante La Clessidra
Via del Castelletto, 26, 56125 Pisa, Italy
SYMPOSIUM

&

AUTHOR MEETS CRITIC
Symposium

Examining scientific theories of emotion

It’s a kind of m...odule? Basic Emotions as Fodorian modules

(Marco Viola – University of Turin, Italy)

During the twentieth century, Basic Emotions used to be deemed one of the most controversial constructs in psychology. They can be construed as a particular kind of modular system (Griffiths 1997), in a sense that is very close to that of Fodor (1983). In the original formulation, Paul Ekman (1992) lists six of them: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise. In recent decades, however, theories such as Ekman’s have undergone several criticisms, that cast doubts on the very existence of modular systems for emotion (e.g. Russell 1994; Barrett 2006). Simultaneously, evidence in favor of neural reuse (Anderson 2010) makes modularity tout court an outdated thesis.

Going against this tide, in this talk I try to rescue the idea that positing emotion modules in the Fodorian sense is still a viable research program, given some provisos. To do so, I unpack Ekman’s Basic Emotion theses into three sub-claims:

(C1) there exist some discrete Basic Emotions, which exhibit modular features;
(C2) Basic Emotions account for all and only the phenomena indicated by the following folk terms: fear, sadness, joy, anger, surprise, disgust;
(C3) Basic Emotions account for all and only the phenomena indicated by the folk term ‘emotion’.

After a brief discussion of some evidence which makes C2 and C3 implausible, I will focus on my main goal, i.e. defending the plausibility of C1. I will stress that

(a) many discussions construe modules and Basic Emotions as natural kinds on an essentialist reading, so that in order to count as such some cognitive system must possess a list of as necessary and sufficient features. I will provide a more charitable interpretation, which construes modules and Basic Emotions as HPC kinds (Boyd 1999), and interpret their features as diagnostic (rather than as essential) properties. I will show how this reading is more akin to what Fodor and Ekman had in mind when they talked about modules and Basic Emotions, respectively.

(b) While most debates focused on the discreteness of Basic Emotion, another tantamount prominent feature of modules has been largely overlooked: namely, their being informationally encapsulated. I will show how this feature seems vindicated, at least for some emotions. In
particular, I focus on the studies on affective blindsight, where cortically blind subjects seem to be able to recognize certain affective visual features (Celeghin et al. 2015).

I will conclude by endorsing a division of labor between Basic Emotion-like approaches, that ought to explain the more modular aspects of our affective lives, and more cognitive approaches (e.g. those of the abovementioned Russell and Barrett), that are better suited to explain more sophisticated emotions.

References

Basic vs. Constructed Emotions: Re-assessing the controversy
(Rodrigo Díaz – University of Bern, Switzerland)

According to Basic Emotion Theory (Ekman, 1999), there is a set of emotions, called basic emotions, which evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life tasks. A central thesis of the theory is that these emotions can be distinguished by their distinctive physiology (in the brain and the rest of the body). This central tenet of the Basic Emotion Theory (BET) has been recently put into question, as research shows that there is a significant amount of within-category variability in the physiological correlates of emotions (Barrett, 2006). This evidence has been used to support the Theory of Constructed Emotion (Barrett, 2018). Against BET, the Theory of Constructed Emotion (TCE) claims that there are no emotion-specific mechanisms. Instead, emotion emerge when a physiological state is categorized as a particular emotion via situated conceptualization. Because different physiological states can be conceptualized as the same emotion, the evidence regarding physiological variability would support TCE over BET.
However, BET has been recently revamped to account for the physiological variability problem. The so-called New BET (Scarantino, 2014) preserves the main idea of the Old BET: that emotions are adaptations. However, it differs in one central aspect. According to the New BET (nBET), folk psychological categories such as “fear” or “anger” do not only refer to responses generated by emotion mechanisms, but also to instances that are not adaptations. As existing work in the physiological correlates of emotion has built on folk categories, what physiological variability shows is that folk emotion categories are not basic emotions, but not that basic emotions do not exist. Thus, emotions’ physiological variability would not favour TCE over (n)BET.

In this paper, I claim that nBET does not actually oppose TCE. While the original BET and TCE involve different explanations for the same phenomena (that referred by folk emotion concepts), nBET and TCE have different objects of study. In fact, TCE and nBET are compatible theories. Both TCE and nBET agree in two main points: (1) the instances that constitute the extension of folk emotion concepts such as ANGER or FEAR are highly variable in terms of physiology, and (2) evolution has shaped a series of mechanisms that produce specific physiological changes in response to relevant situations. However, TCE and nBET differ in what counts as an instance of emotion. In TCE, the extension of folk emotion concepts determines the object of study. In nBET, the instances that constitute the extension of folk emotion concepts count as (basic) emotions iff they share an adaptive mechanism and similar physiology. Thus, the object of study in nBET are the adaptive mechanisms mentioned in (2) above, but not the phenomena referred by folk emotion concepts (1), which would be scientifically uninteresting. Conversely, TCE aims to explain the phenomena referred by folk emotion concepts (1), and not adaptive mechanisms (2), which would be merely contingent contributors to the subject’s physiological state.

References
Since Griffiths’s (1997) What Emotions Really Are, there has been a wide discussion about the natural kind status of emotions. Broadly construed, the question is whether emotions (both «emotion» as a general category, as well as particular emotion categories such as «happiness», «sadness», «fear», and the like) refer to phenomena that can be distinguished independently of our own conceptual framework, presumably in terms of affect programs or at least some discrete pattern at the neural or physiological level. As it is often formulated, the question is whether emotions form natural kinds or not.

In recent years, the focus of this discussion has shifted towards newer empirical evidence challenging a positive answer to this question. Reviews such as Barrett (2006) and meta-analyses such as Lindquist et al. (2012) have attempted to show that emotions are highly variable phenomena, precluding a one-to-one mapping between emotion categories and sets of neural or physiological responses. If this is the case, the story goes, it follows that emotions (at least in their traditional construal) do not form natural kinds. As a result, we must revise our entire emotion-conceptual framework at best, or eliminate emotion categories from scientific inquiry at worst.

As the current debate stands, it is unclear whether the underlying claim on which the discussion rests, that emotions are highly variable phenomena (hereafter the Variability Thesis, or VT), is well-established. On the surface, this may be due to the absence of conclusive empirical evidence for or against VT. In my view, however, the problem runs deeper. As I will argue in my talk, the problem is not the lack of conclusive empirical evidence itself, but rather the absence of criteria concerning what evidence counts as supporting VT. In other words, I claim that VT, as has been formulated in the debate, is underdetermined. If this is true, it is unclear which predictions it makes, precluding us from drawing any conclusions based on it.

I will structure my argument as follows. First, I present a recent analysis of VT, namely, that proposed by Scarantino (2015). According to Scarantino, VT is comprised of two different theses: the No one-to-one correspondence thesis (NOC) and the Low coordination thesis (LC). I expand on Scarantino’s account, showing its current limitations and proposing a more detailed analysis that divides these two theses (NOC and LC) into domain-specific theoretical and empirical claims about emotions and emotion categories. With this new analysis in hand, I review empirical evidence for each of the domains, showing important points of controversy that still remain unanswered and that must be resolved before judging whether empirical evidence
supports or challenges VT. I conclude by suggesting possible avenues and strategies that researchers may adopt both to reinterpret current empirical evidence and to pursue new findings that would have bearing on VT and the natural kind status of emotions.

References
“There is love, of course. And then there’s life, its enemy.” Jean Anouilh

A central issue in my book, The arc of love: How our romantic lives change over time (University of Chicago, 2019) is the conflict between love and life. Romantic love enhances health, happiness, and flourishing. It makes us feel alive. Thus, marriages, which are the prevailing framework of long-term love, have been linked to many health advantages, like lower psychological distress, higher well-being, fewer Doctor’s visits, lower blood pressure, faster healing, and longer life. Love clearly stimulating health, well-being, and (re)productivity. The connection between love (and marriage) and happiness (including flourishing and health) works both ways: it is easier for happy people to fall in love, and it is more likely that those in love will be happy (Esch & Stefano, 2005; Kansky, 2018).

Despite the very positive impact of love upon one’s life, people need more than love to flourish: they need a good-enough living framework in which the two partners continuously interact with each other. (Krebs, 2015). Long-term romantic relationships should take into account non-romantic factors concerning the living together of the two partners. Loving someone is not always sufficient for deciding to live with someone. The degree of love may be sufficient for supporting enduring love, but not enduring living together. People sometimes prefer thriving in life over love—it can be their own thriving or that of their partner. Profound love involves the desire to live with a partner who is thriving in mutual relationship. Sometimes, when this desire cannot be fulfilled, life wins over love. This clash is even more dominant today, when self-fulfillment has become an essential component of marriage (Finkel, 2017).

When love and life go head-to-head, love almost always loses, especially when it is based on intense desire. In the long run, it is when lovers nurture the connection between themselves and do things that enable each other to flourish that love is maintained and enhanced. As it turns out, love is not everything in life, though it is often a central part of it. It is when we give up love for life that romantic compromises and romantic regrets are likely to arise. If indeed, love is not all we need, then it is certainly reasonable for some people to leave the one they love.
References

Critique
Susanne Schmetkamp
University of Basel (Switzerland)
ABSTRACTS
In this talk, I will argue for a reading of Plato’s Republic as divided into three parts corresponding to three different accounts of the soul and of the relation between reason and passion. The three different parts, I will argue, are books 2 through 4 corresponding to the three-part soul of a person who follows convention rather than their own reason and as a result must control their passions rather than simply acting on them; books 5 through 7 corresponding to the soul of a person who—having seen all of being, all the way up to the brightest part of being, the idea of the good—sees the beauty of the good and as a result simply loves it and does it without struggle; and books 8 and 9 corresponding to the three-animal soul of a person who has comprehended the good to an extent and whose emotions correspondingly are partly informed by and responsive to that understanding but not as fully informed by it as the person who simply sees, loves and does the good without effort.

The three parts of the dialogue, the argument will show, correspond to three different levels of psychological or emotional development and three different levels of virtue. The argument will rest on showing terminological differences in the different accounts, for example, the replacement of calculation (to logistikon) in the first account by learning (mathēsis) and wisdom (sophia) in the third; the presence of love (philia) in the rational part of the soul in the third account compared to the clear separation of reason and passion in the first; and on passages that make explicit reference to a longer way to the soul than the one found in books 2 through 4 (4.430c) and to the deficiencies of the type of virtue discussed in those books (10.619b).

The result of the argument will be to show decisively that the three-part account is not Socrates’—or Plato’s—final or preferred account of the soul, of virtue and, more generally, of the relation between reason and emotion. The interpretation also will provide an answer to a question frequently asked by readers of the Meno, namely, if virtue is knowledge, what type of knowledge and knowledge of what? Finally, the interpretation will open new questions about the relation between Plato and Aristotle’s accounts of virtue since, on this interpretation, Plato, too, has a second-order kind or simulacrum of virtue that involves control. Some thoughts about the similarities and differences in their accounts of second-order emotional development and virtue will conclude the talk and leave an opening for further reflection on the topic in the future.
The Eudaimonistic Nature of Emotion

Maria Adamos
Georgia Southern University (USA)

In this essay I argue that human emotions are intrinsically eudaimonistic, i.e. they occur in the context of one’s conception of the good life or well-being. That is, emotions draw our attention to certain goals and attachments, and as Nussbaum notes, they make us see the world from a personal point of view by drawing our attention to the goals that comprise our own sense of eudaimonia. Therefore, emotions are conceptually related to their eudaimonistic goals. Yet, while an emotion logically presupposes an overall aim or goal, eudaimonistic goals are not sufficient for emotion. The eudaimonistic nature of emotion also shows the reason why emotions do not by sheer chance alert us to their objects. For instance, if protecting my life from harm were not an important goal of mine, I would not feel fear. Similarly, if I did not have the goal of not being subject to injustices or insults, I would not feel anger, etc.

The consideration of the eudaimonistic goals of emotion may in turn explain its motivational nature. The reason that certain emotions move us to act is because in the end we would like to protect, maintain, or alter important goals that fit in our conception of the good life, or eudaimonia. Given that goals are motives and reasons for action and that emotions conceptually involve certain eudaimonistic goals, they, through their respective desires and evaluations motivate us to act in certain ways that will ensure that our conception of the good life is satisfied. This also shows why the evaluations that feature in the conceptual relations of the emotions are not simply neutral evaluations. Instead, they are either positive or negative because they relate to either a frustration or a satisfaction of a goal. So, when I am afraid, my evaluation that I am in a dangerous situation is negative because it involves the frustration of the goal of living without a threat to my life. Alternatively, the evaluation in joy that something good has happened is positive because it is a realization of the goal of “being a subject to occurrences that advance my overall eudaimonistic goals”.

Finally, I examine the conceptual relation between the eudaimonistic goal of an emotion and the particular goal elicited by the emotion-related action and argue that while in fear and anger the first presupposes the second, there is no such presupposition in the backward-looking emotions of joy and grief.
I draw on a large database of obituaries to examine the ways in which people who die in violent conflicts are honored and memorialized. I focus on how the emotion of grief is used to motivate both personal and collective action. Ongoing conflicts cannot be understood without reference to the role of grief in constituting personal and communal identities over time. Philosophers such as Blustein (2008) have argued for the duty to remember and memorialize, which involves obligations to accuracy, sincerity, emotional aptness, publicity, and longevity. These sometimes complementary, sometimes competing injunctions have been recognized as far back as Pericles’ funeral oration and Plato’s *Menexenus*. In modern times as well, grief has been used to motivate war-making. George W. Bush pivoted from the grief of the 9/11 terror attacks to a call for war with both Afghanistan and Iraq. Collective grief has also been used to motivate perseverance in ongoing, seemingly futile conflicts. In Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars*, we read that it is “important to say of those who died in war that they did not die in vain,” which he glosses in terms of there being “purposes that are worth dying for,” such as “political independence, communal liberty, human life” (1977, pp. 109-10). In 2003, Bush told the bereaved families of British soldiers who had died in Iraq that their deaths were “not in vain” because their actions “will make the world more secure and the world more peaceful in the long run.” By contrast, in a 2014 an op-ed in *The Oregonian*, Jim Weisenburg wrote, “My son did not die in Iraq in vain.” Why? Not for “political goals” or freedom or protecting human life. Weisenburg argues that his son did not die in vain because he was “fighting for the guy next to him, for those in his unit.” In this work, I compare the obituaries of American and Australian soldiers KIA in the last two decades with those of ISIS (Islamic State) fighters memorialized in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines.

References:
Commemoration and Emotional Imperialism

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War and conflict are often commemorated or remembered through statues, ceremonies, and objects. In the United Kingdom, perhaps the most well-known commemorative practice involves wearing a red poppy to commemorate those who have died fighting for the British Army.

While many people take part in this practice, some choose not to do so. For example, the footballer James McClean refuses to wear a poppy because of the behaviour of the British Army in Northern Ireland, including the Bloody Sunday massacre. McClean has repeatedly been subjected to negative reactions in the media and from the general public for his decision, including occasional death threats, despite the fact the British government has admitted the killings on Bloody Sunday were unjust.

Another case involves the footballer Nemanja Matic. He refuses to wear the poppy because of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. The interventions by NATO, in 1995 and 1999, were provoked by war crimes committed by Yugoslav forces, including massacres, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, crimes against humanity and genocide, which according to a UN report were committed in order to create an ethnically pure Serbian state. Matic’s behaviour has not received the same kind of criticism as McClean’s has, though he has received some.

In this paper, we use McClean’s and Matic’s cases as a case study in order to develop a desideratum for an adequate account of commemoration. We argue that the negative reactions to McClean and Matic are both inappropriate. Both cases, we argue, involve affective injustices. We argue that McClean’s case involves emotional imperialism. While Matic’s case may not involve emotional imperialism, we argue that it does involve a failure to respect his right to grieve. Thus, we propose that an adequate account of commemoration must not permit practices that involve or perpetuate such affective injustices.

The paper proceeds as follows. In §2, we start by describing the current practice of commemoration in the UK, both as it is intended to be practiced and as it is actually practiced. In §3, we describe existing criticisms of the actual practice in the UK, some of which are explicit in the writings we appeal to, some of which are implicit, and some of which overlap. In §4, we argue that the existing British practice of commemoration encourages a specific form of cultural imperialism that we call emotional imperialism. In §5, we appeal to the work of Cecile Fabre (2016) and Zofia Stemplowska (forthcoming) to suggest how the British practice could be improved. However, in §6 we show that even the Fabre/Stemplowska ideal of commemoration leaves the problem of emotional imperialism and affective injustice more generally.
Thus, we propose that an adequate account of commemoration must not involve or perpetuate affective injustices, whether via emotional imperialism or via violating one’s right to grieve.

Moral Distress and Responsibility
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Moral distress is a term that was first coined in social scientific study of nursing to refer to a distinctive emotional burden carried by many healthcare workers. It is felt when a health professional makes a moral judgement about a situation and is prevented from acting on that judgement by their co-workers or institution. More specifically, the term is usually used to refer to a painful response to a situation in which one judges that a certain course of action would be wrong, but is prevented from avoiding that wrong course of action by institutional or professional constraints. A palliative-care nurse, for instance, might report moral distress if instructed to administer a life-prolonging treatment that they believe to be harmful and unnecessary.

Attempts to distinguish moral distress from other negative emotions in the same context (e.g. despair at patient suffering) sometimes observe that those who feel moral distress believe they are responsible. But responsible for what? The primary problem facing any attempt to distinguish moral distress by way of its belief about responsibility is that the introduction of such a belief seems to render moral distress rationally incoherent. For if a negatively valenced emotion is to count as an instance of moral distress, it appears it must include two incompatible beliefs: (a) that I (the health worker) have been prevented from acting morally by institutional or colleague interference for which I am not responsible and (b) that I am responsible for the harmful situation.

I suggest we can better understand the responsibility involved in moral distress without thereby rendering it an intrinsically irrational emotion. My suggestion in this paper will be that the kind of responsibility that health workers refer to when they feel moral distress is a species of “taking responsibility”.

Taking responsibility is an active form of responsibility that contrasts with passive forms of moral responsibility that occupy the majority of current debates about responsibility. Accountability, attribution of morally salient traits or actions, blameworthiness, or being responsible, are all passive forms of responsibility insofar as a person responsible in these senses is the object of a judgement about their responsibility the truth of which is independent of whether they themselves acknowledge it. With regard to each of these forms of responsibility, the nurse who experiences moral distress is not responsible.
Conversely, when someone takes responsibility they must acknowledge or assume their responsibility in order for it to be true that they are indeed taking responsibility. That is, it cannot be true that a person is taking responsibility and does not know or accept they are doing so. Taking responsibility can take a number of forms: a CEO can take responsibility for the mistakes made by a corporate entity; a person can act responsibly, by for instance being a responsible parent, worker, or citizen; a member of a collective can “step up” to ensure that group delivers on its commitments, even if it is no single individual’s responsibility to meet that commitment.

Drawing the distinction between being responsible and taking responsibility allows us to make better sense of moral distress in the following way. When a nurse feels moral distress she is not responsible for the harm that may befall the patient, nor does she believe she is responsible. In fact, she is probably used to being in situations in which flawed institutions can lead to significant harms for patients. But she will nonetheless attempt to take responsibility, much as she would in other situations of institutional failure. Moral distress occurs when attempts to take responsibility are frustrated.

Disappointment and condescension
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Martha Nussbaum’s overview of “political emotions” relies on an open-ended list: anger, fear, sympathy, disgust, pride, envy, guilt, grief, and others. Depending on their tonality, the emotions that Nussbaum discusses seem to divide into inclusive and exclusionary ones. While pride (of one’s country) is an emotion creating a bond that unites all citizens of the country, disgust directed against, those who are not “like us” serves the aim of excluding them from the political community.

There are other kinds of emotions, driving the (antagonistic) relationships within the political community. Following the rise of (mostly right-wing) populist movements in European countries, Brexit, or Donald Trump’s election, a surge of analyses by liberal politicians and theorists attempted to understand and explore the motivations and standpoints of “the other half”. I don’t aim at covering the whole variety of these reactions; only two of its typical species.

First, the incredulity how people could vote “irrationally” and against their own (basically, everybody’s) political and economic interests. This disappointment follows from a surprise. In psychology, disappointment is mostly analysed as frustrated desire. In contrast, I would argue for a connection to surprise; not a surprise at something impossible (cf. “I am disappointed but not surprised”), but at something that shouldn’t have happened. In the background, there is a dim normative expectation (unlike firm normative expectations, where the response might take the
form of a sanction). As such, this political disappointment appears to be a passive, disconcerted kind of emotion: the surprising political stance strikes the disappointed observer primarily as one to which she does not like having to react to. Second, there are the reductionist expectations, seeing factors such as poverty, social exclusion, or media manipulation as responsible for the unexpected, “irrational” vote. Unlike disappointment, this emotional response pretences at being optimistic or constructive. Removing the social causes of the irrational vote should remedy the wrong vote. This is a reaction of condescension. While the condescending evaluator perceives her own position as backed by reasons, she reacts to the other position as a mere result of causal influences. Similarly to disappointment, this can be seen as a reaction of denial: a spontaneous strategy of coping with events until now considered unimaginable, or rather not considered as all (not even argued as impossible).

Little literature analyses disappointment as an emotion; practically none deals with condescension. Yet neither can be exhaustively described as a mere statement of facts regarding their objects; both entail an element of evaluation (pity, contempt). Their analysis as emotions is thus needed. Both emotions represent responses typically situated within a political landscape of disagreeing standpoints and sentiments; yet in a tensed relationship to the claim of legitimate plurality. They may reflect an implicit denial of legitimate plurality, unless it was unilaterally outlined. Both are emotional responses that entail questioning the full decision-making subjectivity or responsibility of the others. As such, they are emotions of exclusion, but of a kind distinctly different from Nussbaum’s examples of fear, disgust, or envy.

Moral emotions and moral values: On the justificatory force of emotional experiences

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Concerning sources of immediate justification, there are three types of experiences that are often considered the only plausible candidates of justification-conferring experiences: Perceptual experiences justify beliefs about physical states of affairs, rational intuitions justify beliefs about a priori truths, and introspective experiences justify beliefs about one’s own mental states. In my contribution, I shall defend the view that emotional experiences can immediately justify beliefs about the evaluative status of certain states of affairs. By an emotion or emotional experience, I understand an intentional mental state that presents its object in an evaluative way. This means that emotions exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character, which qualifies them as a distinctive type of experience. When you are having a walk and suddenly a grizzly bear approaches you, the emotion of fear presents this object (the approaching grizzly
bear) as dangerous. My focus will be moral emotions. Prime examples of moral emotions are guilt and indignation. When you selfishly refuse to help a friend in need, the emotion of guilt may present your (lack of) action in a distinctive way as morally condemnable. Reading in the newspapers how corrupt politicians do not care about the people who voted for them may evoke the emotion of indignation. The question I address is whether such emotions can immediately justify your beliefs that the respective actions are morally wrong. Only very recently have researchers in the analytic tradition begun to investigate the relationship between emotion and value (cf. Roeser & Todd 2014). Those few works that explicitly defend the claim that moral emotions are a source of immediate justification typically stress the similarities to perceptual experiences (cf. Pelser 2014). However, so far the question what it is that makes emotional experiences a source of immediate justification is rarely addressed. What gives them their justificatory force? With respect to perceptual experiences, the most common externalist answer is reliability: Perceptual experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their reliability. I will defend an internalist approach. More precisely, I shall argue that emotional experiences (like perceptual experiences) gain their justificatory force by virtue of their distinctive phenomenal character. With respect to perceptual experiences and rational intuitions, such a phenomenological conception of experiential justification has recently been defended, e.g., by Chudnoff 2013 and Church 2013. In my contribution, I aim at broadening this approach such that it also includes emotional experiences. In this context, I will draw on the expanding literature on moral perceptions and argue that moral perceptions can be identified as moral emotions.

References
In the last twenty years, research in moral psychology and neuroscience has given an important contribution into affirming the central – if not absolutely leading – role of emotions in the meta- and normative ethics’ discussion on the foundation and justification of moral judgement. In fact, scientific evidence showing the predominant role of emotions undermines traditional rationalist views which aim to found moral judgement on reason only. According to the experimental results of many studies conducted by several scholars (J. Haidt in primis), the role of reason, in the formulation of moral judgement, is limited to the social need of providing a post-hoc rationalization in order to justify a “gut” (instinctive) reaction; so, the source of moral judgement would be entirely emotional. These positions sympathize with the meta-ethical and normative perspectives of traditional sentimentalist moral theories and, as such, with the contemporary emotionist proposal suggested by Jesse Prinz, which leads him to embrace moral relativism.

In light of the above considerations, the aim of this proposal is to investigate and reconsider the role of moral reasoning in the debate around the basis and constitution of moral judgement, reshaping its boundaries; but, at the same time, stressing its relevance in order to formulate an exhaustive judgement, constant over time and intersubjectively communicable. Hence, positions that claim a sharp rejection of reason in the attempt to define what is ethically right or wrong will be criticized for the following reasons: a) we will argue, in contrast with emotionist positions, that moral reasoning can be understood as having the potential to elicit/influence emotional reactions or sentiments, and not only as a post-hoc rationalization of emotional impulses; b) moreover, we will argue that offering rational arguments justifying moral judgements is the only way to avoid emotionism’s relativistic outcomes. Indeed, the rational justification of a moral behavior makes it potentially universally communicable and intelligible to others. Being rationality the only available moral language with which to communicate reasons, only through it it is possible to understand and welcome the moral views which are held by others, detecting similarities – even if small ones – between different moral systems. Such points of convergence are able to ensure a peaceful coexistence of human beings in a pluralistic – but not relativistic – perspective. Therefore, we think that we should not consider individuals living in a society as mere moral foreigners, unable to find any
common ground; but rather as moral acquaintances, able to build – with the help of reason – a common, even if minimal, ethical ground.

In Defense of Distinctively Moral Anger
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Anger is thought by many philosophers to be central to morality. Anger often occurs as a response to wrongdoing and seems to play an important role in the blaming and punishing of wrongdoers. As such, it’s neither uncommon nor surprising for anger to be referred to as a moral emotion, though what precisely is meant by the term “moral anger” is not always clear; does generic, garden variety anger, which is likely familiar to us from computer malfunctions or heavy traffic, also show up in the moral domain, perhaps as a morally appropriate, fitting, or epistemically reliable response to (certain features of) wrongdoing? Or is there a distinctive psychological state of moral anger that is differentiable from generic anger, and from other emotion types? The latter, ontological question is the target of this paper. In this paper, I defend the claim that there is a distinctively moral subtype of anger. My overarching goal in this paper is to offer a novel, empirically-supported account of moral anger that constitutes a positive answer to the ontological question about moral anger, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to vindicate the existence of a genuinely moral emotion while making sense of the idea that the moral emotions should be understood as a recognizable subset within the general class of the emotions.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I motivate the claim that there is a distinctively moral kind of anger that is differentiable from generic anger, which typically takes non-moral objects and is characterized by action tendencies that aim to overcome goal-frustration. In section 3, I argue that moral anger counts as distinctively moral primarily in virtue of its action tendencies, which are typically triggered by perceived injustice against oneself or others and aim to satisfy two moral goals or aims: a communicative goal, and a retributive goal. In developing my account, I respond to recent work by David Shoemaker (2015; 2018). Shoemaker advances an illuminating account of moral anger, which he labels blaming anger. According to Shoemaker, the defining aim or goal of blaming anger is communicative. He argues that any sanctioning or retaliatory action tendencies that are part of blaming anger are merely instrumental to what he considers its fundamental communicative aim. I argue that Shoemaker’s account of moral anger is incomplete, because it does not adequately explain cases in which moral anger is partially satisfied despite its communicative aim not being met. My account of moral anger, which includes a retributive aim that can come apart from the communicative goal, is able to explain these cases, and thus extends Shoemaker’s account in an important way.
Taking asexuality seriously: implications for the philosophy of sex and love

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Asexuals, who make up about 1% of the population (Decker, 2014, p. 3), but have been largely ignored by philosophers, profess to not experience sexual attraction but often experience, and want, romantic relationships. Some asexuals also experience non-directed sexual desire; some may masturbate; and some asexuals want to engage in sexual activity with other people despite feeling little or no sexual desire or little or no sexual attraction to the person with whom they have sex.

In this paper, we will assume that asexuals are right that they can experience romantic love without any sexual attraction, and that they might want to have sex for reasons other than sexual attraction, and we will consider what follows from this. We will not argue for the view that asexuals are right about what they experience, beyond pointing out that to deny this is to distrust a large number of people’s reports of their lived experience. Asexuals are a minority, but not an insignificant minority. Any empirically minded approach to matters of love and sex ought to resist doubting the reality of the experiences of large numbers of people from the outset.

Therefore, we want to take asexuality seriously and see what the implications are for our (philosophical) understanding of sex and love. We suggest that if we take asexuality seriously, there are (at least) two implications which could challenge the way that love and sex are typically conceived.

1) The connection between sexual attraction and love: What distinguishes romantic love from other forms of love, in particular from friendship, is often said to be sexual attraction and (exclusive) sexual activity. It is the ‘default setting’ for romantic love to include sex, and so it seems reasonable to expect your romantic partner to have sex with you, even to end the relationship if there is no sexual element to it. However, as some asexuals want and have romantic relationships and feel romantic love, this suggests that romantic love is not necessarily sexual, or that it involves sex in less central ways. The implication of this is that romantic love and sex can be decoupled for allosexuals, (this is a term sometimes used for people who experience sexual attraction and are thus not asexual) as well as for asexuals, contrary to much of the philosophical literature, and the common understanding of it.
2) The role of sexual activity in our lives: While there are numerous ‘acceptable’ reasons to have sex: love, intimacy, procreation, fun, pleasure etc, we sometimes feel discomfited by the idea of people having sex with people towards whom they lack attraction or desire. However, as some asexuals want to engage in sexual activity for reasons other than sexual attraction this suggests that sex can play a more varied role in people’s lives and encourages us to think about sexuality and the role of sexual activity more broadly.

Emotions in-between. The affective dimension of participatory sense-making

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The aim of the paper is to discuss and evaluate the epistemic role of emotions in participatory sense-making, assuming 4Ecognition as background and addressing the question about the function of emotions in knowledge from the point of view of epistemology. In fact, not all the cognitive processes bring about knowledge as true beliefs: cognitive processes give us information about the world and ourselves, but this does not necessarily mean that the acquired information is correct. Very often we make epistemic mistakes and many times emotions play a significant role in these mistakes, especially in practical reasoning, as when we choose to buy an expensive dress moved by the excitement of the moment, although knowing that this money is necessary for paying our flat monthly rent, or when we regret to have revised our decision to go to visit our beloved grandmother because we were not in the mood. Therefore, one of the main jobs in epistemology is to analyse the conditions that are required for the generation of true beliefs, assessing when a cognitive process is truthconducive. In this paper I analyse the conditions for ascribing to emotions a beneficial function in the social-cognitive processes that brings to knowledge as true belief. Doing so, I highlight their value for knowledge: emotions are not just detrimental for knowledge, as in the cases I have just mentioned, they can be very helpful too.

I first ask why could emotions be beneficial for the collective processes of knowledge, especially discussing Battaly (2018) and arguing for a conceptualisation of emotions as socially extended motivations in virtue epistemology; then, I discuss participatory sensemaking (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2008; Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009), both conceptually and phenomenologically, arguing for a fundamental role played by emotions in boosting epistemic cooperation and determining the quality of social bonds. I advocate their specific function in epistemic cooperation. Epistemic cooperation is what brings about the generation of a shared meaning in participatory sense-making and thus, since emotions function as socially extended
motivations, they boost the relationships among the agents, bonding them to the aims of their epistemic community. This does not imply that the meanings we build together would always be justified; but it highlights that certain conditions are required for becoming skilful sense-makers or for making participatory sense-making a reliable epistemic practice. I argue that these conditions should be found in the virtues of the epistemic agents and of their interactions, and this also means that they should be found in the affective roots of intellectual virtues and in their embodied motivations, the emotions.

Mood, Shades, and Hues: Aesthetics and the Phenomenology of Emotion

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“IN THE RIVERS north of the future/ I cast the net, that you/ haltingly weight/ with the shadows the stones have been/ writing” (Atemwende, Breathturn). This poem, composed by Paul Celan (1920-1970), the acclaimed German language poet, conveys an emotional attachment to the world, indeed, a voice tuned by silence. The silence might be heavy, the shadows seem to be dark, and the mood is perhaps somber. But all of these features are not necessarily negative. I see a similar theme in the work of the Japanese essayist Junichirō Tanizaki (1886-1965), who praises shadows in a perceptive description of the walls in a traditional Japanese house: “[...] if we are not to disturb the glow, we finish the walls with sand in a single neutral colour. The hue may differ from room to room, but the degree of difference will be ever so slight; not so much a difference in colour as in shade, a difference that will seem to exist only in the mood of the viewer” (“In Praise of Shadows”, Tanizaki, 2001, p. 30). Encountering both texts, I wonder, how is “mood”, embodied in shadows, experienced as a concrete phenomenon? And how is it expressed as a lingering emotion? Indeed, are we talking about a subtle phenomenon of nature or is the subtlety a web, woven from human relationships? Philosophically gazing at shadows, the natural world and the human domain are inevitably intertwined, but are they analogous or contradictory to each other, and how to go about mapping such complexity in terms of relationships and fissures between the natural, the humane, and the cultural? Finally, how could such delicate and intricate phenomenon guide our ethical and aesthetic existence in this world — could there be the possibility, once again in history, that philosophy would provide us not only with a hope, but also with a sense of wonder that we do not only exist, but truly, happily and beautifully live together?
A recent study sets out to understand emotions as “manners of thinking” (Berninger, 2016), focusing on how emotions affect cognitive activities. Indeed, this study helps us to understand to what degree emotional modes of thinking (happily or sadly) will influence the consequences of our perception and cognition. However, emotions in such studies are only referred to as “occurrent, short term” (ibid), and therefore widely considered as a topos of psychology. On the other hand, the “long-term” emotions, or we might say, mood, have been discussed as an ontological concept in the 20th century phenomenological tradition. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) developed an existential philosophy based upon his conception of “mood” (Stimmung), which influenced Hermann Schmitz’s (1881-1960) new phenomenology of “Atmosphere” (Atmosphären), and the contemporary phenomenologist Klaus Held’s theory of “Fundamental mood” (Grundstimmung) within the context of our living world. Recently, the Japanese phenomenologist Tadashi Ogawa modified this European-phennomenological line of thinking through an Eastern Asian perspective, from which he proposed a “phenomenology of wind” (Ogawa, 1998).

Our philosophical approach to mood is not confined to any single type of emotion such as happiness, anger, or sadness, nor does it describe a short occurrence. We perceive mood as a complexity of emotions with hues and shades that involve the Husserlian “time consciousness”, modified and re-shaped through time-being, i.e. space and location. By discerning and analyzing such intricate relationships, we will re-encounter the phenomenological world as understood by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), developing an inherent connectedness, sometimes expressed as fissures and gaps, through analyzing both literary, artistic and philosophical works, as well as life experiences.

Rather than concluding moral principles, we will continue our journey by engaging in a conversation with the East Asia traditions setting out from the proto-Shinto world view, and explore the unique aesthetic phenomenon wabi-sabi, which, throughout the history up to the present, was able to transform and merge traditional ideas of the ethics of respect into daily routines. Though wabi-sabi as an aesthetic idea may be ephemeral and floating, whimsical and intangible like antelopes’ traces, the essence of our cultivated self is indeed expressed in every single step of our daily life, embodied in everything we encounter. Wabi-sabi embraces the phenomenon of shadows and constitutes an important aspect of our phenomenological study of emotion. The purpose of this paper is to examine our personal wonder on how such lived experience can turn to joy, and constitute the foundation of our immanent being, and raises an open question, whether it is possible and desirable, for each one of us, to experience,
and even to live according to such an emotionally integrated ethical-aesthetic principle.

References

Technology and emotions: following Günther Anders’ “history of feelings”
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When Günther Anders writes about the “promethean shame”, he refers to the sentiment of inadequacy that humans feel when facing the perfection of their technological products. We are not made of replaceable pieces, we cannot resolve complex calculations, we have to make choices to live and maybe we make the wrong choice, we are defective, we die. This is the feeling that affects men in 20th century and these are the reasons why they feel obsolete. What is peculiar in Anders’ analysis is his claim that shame is now a universal feeling, a feeling that we experience as species in front of something that cannot really judge us in any way.
Starting from Anders’ considerations, the aim of the paper is to investigate the working mechanism that triggers shame as the predominant emotion in the relationship between human beings and machines in general. The thesis that I propose as a first step of my paper is that our feeling of inadequacy is not related to an irrational attitude but it is in fact connected with a lack of comprehension. This incapacity to understand concerns the man who cannot grasp anymore that machines are his own products. This is due to the complex network of relations generated by the 20th century production system. In the same way, this system has transformed and in certain cases made disappeared other emotions such as love and hate. By analyzing these changes we can outlined, as Anders would say, a “history of feelings” (Geschichte des Fühlens).

The framing of shame, hate, and love in such historical terms allows us to think about our contemporaneity trying to verify if Anders’ judgements are still valid today. Otherwise, we may explore whether further transformations in our productive and cultural system, open up to a new chapter of that history of feelings.

The role of fear and illusion in the analysis of religion as a passion according to Thomas Hobbes

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The thoughts of Thomas Hobbes in his works, especially in De Cive, Leviathan and Behemoth, become an index of the angst, the terror and the fear experienced in the seventeenth century, which moved souls to mixed feelings and caused political sedition and religious wars.

Emotions are called passions in Hobbesian language; in the etymological meaning of emotionem (from emotus, past participle of emovere; to take out), in other words a movement "caused by something".

Human passions, according to Hobbes, always move towards an object of desire, and the choice of this object depends on the individual constitution and the education received (Leviathan, Introd. 1651).

In this regard, Hobbes emphasizes in Leviathan that passions are expressed through body language and speech, which could lead to unclear and disguised communication, depending on the education received by the individual.

Hobbes argues that from the conatus (Lev.VI,1) of passions always arises a choice between a combination that can be good/evil, aversion/appetite etc; these concepts
have no value in themselves but only as a result of a comparison. The study of human nature and passions is essential in Hobbes for the constitution of his political theological project.

The fundamental and universal passion for all human beings is fear. Fear is the source of the passage from natural state to political state. It corresponds to the death fear. But another important aspect of fear regards religion. In the twelfth chapter of Leviathan, Hobbes declares that the seed of religion is the anxiety for the future, in the fear of invisible powers - “the seed of religion is [also] only in man; and consist in some peculiar quality, and this lies in the fear of invisible powers, generated by anxiety for the future” (Lev. XII. 6).

Fear becomes the instrument of the sovereign power, and fear and strength are fortified by religion as a passion.

Nevertheless, another word connected to and at the same time in contrast to fear is illusion that Hobbes expresses with the verb to feign (Lev. VIII).

When Hobbes speaks of illusion, he connects the meaning to the artifice of an interlocutor such as a false prophet. In the illusion, fear is missing and is replaced by an excess of uncontrolled passions.

In this analysis of the role of fear and illusion related to emotions (passions) and human actions, it will also be necessary to examine the biblical references interpreted by Hobbes in his political re-reading of religion.

Furthermore, it will be necessary to highlight the elements that deceive man into an excess of passions or lead him to a softening of passions at the moment of deliberation. So the aim it to see how much passions and the control over them can be fundamental for a religion that is in function of politics, a religion that itself becomes a passion of the same politics. On the other hand, it is essential to identify which elements of the passions have been erroneously exalted to moral virtues, so much so that they manifest themselves in the attitudes of the speakers, false prophets and those who thus foment souls with lies.

**Heidegger on Mood, Metaphysics, and Nihilism**

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Grant that we are always in some mood and that our mood determines the way the world shows up to us. What does this entail for those human activities that seek to reveal the true nature of the world? In seeking the true nature of beings, for instance,
must we privilege the way beings show up to us under some mood(s) at the expense of others? If so, which mood(s) should we privilege? And why? My paper offers a new interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy that uncovers its resources for addressing these questions.

I begin by exposing Heidegger’s interest in the presuppositions of metaphysics. He construes metaphysics as the domain of inquiry that is guided by the question, “What is the basic character—or ‘true nature’—of beings?” As he points out, metaphysical inquiry presupposes (1) that beings show up to us and (2) that they show up to us as having some basic character.

As a means to accounting for these presuppositions, Heidegger turns our attention to mood. He maintains that our being in a mood makes beings matter to us in some way or other, and does so prior to our reflecting upon beings via words and concepts. And only by mattering (i.e., becoming salient) to us in some way or other do beings first show up to us. Accordingly, by first making beings matter to us, mood first allows beings to show up to us.

But moods always make beings matter to us in some particular respect. E.g., depending on the mood we find ourselves in, beings may matter (and so, show up) to us as the threatening (in fear), wonderful (in wonder), awesome (in awe), and so on. In this manner, moods make beings show up to us as having some basic character—a basic character that may shift depending on our mood. Accordingly, Heidegger maintains that a metaphysics always (albeit, often unwittingly) presupposes a mood that guides its inquiries by first making beings show up to the inquirer as having some basic character. This mood then prefigures the metaphysics that we arrive at.

I go on to show that, on Heidegger’s account, modern metaphysics privileges the mood of certitude above all else and thereby arrives at an understanding of beings as mere objects that stand by to be controlled, manipulated, and disposed of by the human subject. Heidegger critiques this metaphysical position by noting that, although it helps us to control and manipulate beings, it leads to a nihilistic relationship with nature. Approaching everything as a mere object to be manipulated and controlled, we end up disempowering (if not, destroying) those beings with which we interact, he contends. And this leads to a sense of disenchantment with life; a sense that life lacks value. I then conclude the paper by exposing Heidegger’s antidote to this nihilism—i.e., his attempt at privileging a new mood in his philosophizing: a mood of wonder and astonishment in the midst of beings.
Grotesqueness and emotion
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The relation of aesthetic qualities to emotions has occupied philosophers for centuries, especially those philosophers who did not share the particular (modern) conception that the aesthetic attitude is detached, “devoid of interest” (“interesselos”) (Kant) etc. (While ‘aesthetics’ is a modern term, I contend there is a pre-modern, event ancient aesthetics avant la lettre.) Thus Plato argued that the beautiful constitutes the intentional object of love (at a specific level, at least),1 and the German word for ‘ugly’, ‘hässlich’, is even the adjective originally correlated to ‘hassen’ (‘to hate’). Aesthetic qualities depend upon human perception. They are based on physical qualities – that’s why they are experienced as qualities of the object –, but cannot be reduced to physical qualities. An aesthetic quality from the immediate neighborhood of ugliness (or, possibly, a sub-class of it) is grotesqueness. Yet it has seldom been scrutinized under the aspect of emotion. This is particularly true of philosophers; humanities scholars of visual arts and literature make up the few exceptions to that claim.2 Philosophical reserve vis-à-vis the topic may be due to its strange genealogy – ‘grotesque’ is derived from Italian ‘la grotta’, ‘the cave’ –; it thus seems to resist conceptual analysis and perhaps can be defined only historically.

In a brief talk, the topic cannot be covered comprehensively. A reasonable restriction of the field of investigation may be to delimit it to grotesque facial expression(s). Two questions, then, can be distinguished:
(1) Does the grotesque shape in some way embody a certain type of emotion?
(2) Is there a typical emotional reaction to the grotesque?

These are the questions I wish to follow up (bearing in mind that thinking things through in philosophical fashion only leads up to a certain point, from where empirical research in – individual as well as social – psychology would have to take over).

I would like to put to test the initial conjecture that relevant emotions are on the one hand side amusement (because the grotesque tends to be ridiculous) and, on the other hand, disgust or, alternatively, fright. Whereas typically, amusement and fright reside far apart, in facing grotesqueness there may be a rather thin line separating them
Léon Dumont (1837-1877) was an influential thinker from Valenciennes (France) who remained almost completely unknown in the History of Ideas. He started studying philosophy with great interest in aesthetics, leading him to publish many works in psychology and physiology, later echoed by famous authors such as William James, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, and Luigi Pirandello. However, they hardly mentioned him as an influence, which may have been instrumental in his lack of notoriety.

Dumont’s philosophical foundation essentially consists of influences from Scottish Enlightenment, German intellectual movement, and Darwin’s evolutionism. The main goal of this French philosopher was to create a science of sensibility in order to demonstrate the physiological nature of sentiments and, in this way, to fill out the epistemological gap between mind and body. Unlike the aestheticians following the Baumgartian tradition, which understood aesthetics as a science of beauty, Dumont took up William Hamilton’s project to reform the discipline of aesthetics in order to turn it into a science of pleasure. The topic of emotions drew a great part of his attention, especially in his book entitled 'Théorie scientifique de la sensibilité; le plaisir et la peine' published in 1875.

Dumont’s first approach with emotions is to classify them. Although he distinguishes pleasant emotions from unpleasant ones, he disagrees with William Paley, who reduces each emotion to a pleasure or a pain of varying intensity and duration, separating that emotion from the sensitive situation from which it first emerged. Dumont identifies further criteria that he judges crucial to establish a more elaborate classification. According to his definition of pleasure and pain – i.e. respectively an increase or a decrease of force (or energy) in the conscious individual – he focuses on the many ways in which this modification of force occurs. Dumont articulates his classification of emotions around three physiological concepts: energy expenditure, excitation (or stimuli), and repair (through sleep or nutrition). Consciousness plays a central role in these considerations, firstly because it is a necessary condition for pleasure and pain – whether organic or mental –, and secondly because it also allows us to voluntarily produce pleasurable emotions. In fact, Dumont makes a particular use of the concept of ‘energy’ – or ‘force’. He applies it indifferently to account for physical and psychological processes. This results in an objection from Dumont’s
friend, Joseph Delbœuf – a mathematician and physician – who criticises the incoherence of using terms of physics in psychological discourses.

In this paper, I want to present in detail Dumont’s theory of emotions as a sample of his empirical attempt to establish a science of sensibility. I will focus on his discussion about pleasure – a key point related to the concepts of taste and consciousness. Furthermore, in regard to the current state of physics and neuroscience, I want to highlight the fact that Dumont’s use of physical ontology in the explanation of psychological processes is not as absurd as it seemed to his contemporaries.

Fear of The Gruffalo: A Case of Emotions as Testimony
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The Gruffalo is a popular children’s book where a little mouse deceives animals in the forest into feeling fear, not eating him, and running away because a scary monster (The Gruffalo) might eat all of them. Then, the mouse also deceives the Gruffalo into being afraid of him. The fear of each of the forest animals, in addition to the Gruffalo, is based on the testimony of the mouse—

“Well, Gruffalo,” said the mouse. “You see? Everyone is afraid of me! But now my tummy’s beginning to rumble. My favourite food is — gruffalo crumble!”

“Gruffalo crumble!” The Gruffalo said, and quick as the wind he turned and fled.

Like the Gruffalo, it seems that plenty of our emotions are based on the testimony of others. This raises many concerns. Testimony is traditionally understood as a speech act or an assertion. And, a widely accepted norm for knowledge is: if Jane knows that $p$, and Jane asserts that $p$ to Kate, and Kate accepts $p$ on the basis of Jane’s testimony, then Kate knows that $p$, (Hintikka 1962, Evans 1982, Reynolds 2002). However, with regards to emotions, one may feel an emotion on the basis of another’s assertion or merely on the basis of another person’s emotion (without them having asserted anything). In light of some of the lessons from debates in epistemology, I suggest some ways in which to understand how one feels an emotion on the basis of testimony.
It is not merely *that* one feels an emotion on the basis of another’s testimony, but how to assess this emotion in terms of fit or warrant. In Epistemology, there are plenty of debates concerning when beliefs are legitimately based on the testimony of others. The Gettier cases show us that there is a difference between justified, true belief and knowledge (where knowledge is supposed to be nonaccidental). Tyler Burge distinguishes between warrant, justification, and entitlement. *Warrant* is a general term that may be used to refer to either justification or entitlement. *Entitlement* is a type of warrant that one need not have access to or understand. On this Burge writes, “We are entitled to rely, other things equal, on perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and on—I will claim—the word of others,” (1993: 458-459).

According to emotion theorists, there is an important difference between emotions that are warranted and fitting and emotions that are non-accidentally fitting. I argue that some theories of emotions have difficulty making sense of this distinction. Additionally, there is a sharp difference between one’s fear that is based on direct knowledge and experience versus one’s fear that is based on another’s testimony. The assessment of warrant for the former is more obvious than that of the latter. With the later, issues related to Gettier worries point to potential difficulties for emotion theorists. This paper explores whether it is fitting and warranted for the Gruffalo to feel fear on the basis of the mouse’s testimony.

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**Scripted Emotion Concepts**

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One of the central roles of concepts is category recognition—deciding how to classify the things we encounter. Thus, a theory of emotion concepts should, at least, encompass a theory of emotion recognition. Leading theories of emotion recognition tend to be perceptual and context invariant. This is untenable. Here I argue that we need a theory of emotion recognition, and hence emotion concepts, that allows for context sensitivity. I argue that this is best explained by proposing that emotions are recognized and conceptualized using scripts. As a subsidiary goal, I will show that these scripts also incorporate knowledge of social categories and thus enshrine various biases that impact our understanding of emotions. An adequate theory of emotion concepts should allow for such sociopolitical dimensions. According to the dominant view, emotion recognition happens automatically, fast, and reliably. Ekman, for example, claims that there is a biologically fixed set of basic emotions
(Ekman, 1969, 1971, 1999). Thus, emotional expressions, Ekman argues, are distinctive universal signals: there is not only an emotion-specific physiology but also emotionspecific expressions. Ekman’s claims seem to entail that people, independent of culture and context, have a universal capacity to recognize specific facial muscle movements as emotional expressions. But claiming that emotion recognition is independent of context is highly problematic. Studies on emotional expressions show that social context has a lasting effect on how emotional expressions are interpreted (Hess, 2009, Crozier & de Jong, 2012, Gendron & Barrett, 2017) and thus assert the hypothesis that social context plays a crucial role for emotion recognition. For example, there are different cues to anger in the workplace, while driving, or in intimate relationships. Social categories also influence anger recognition. For example, white people sometimes perceive people of color as angry when they are not. If someone displays anger (or any other emotional expression), responses will depend on the contextual structures given in that situation, e.g., gender, social status, occupation, situation. Some theories of emotions allow for context sensitivity. This is a key feature of theories that identify emotions with scripts (Russell, 1991, 2003). As a theory of emotions, this is controversial, but my proposal here is to extend Russell’s approach to emotion recognition. That is, in this paper I argue that emotion recognition, hence concepts, works via scripts. Scripts ground our understanding of emotion terms and allow us to categorize emotions in real world situations. Scripts also build in socially inculcated assumptions about group differences. In this way our emotion concepts also become loci of cultural knowledge and biases.

The fear of the stranger. Xenophobia from its conceptual roots to its contemporary relevance
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One of the most characterising human Emotions is Fear. This paper aims to discuss a specific form of fear that seems to be innate to humankind but is somehow also shaped by the cultural, social and political environment in which this private, as well as political, emotion arises. This specific form of fear is ultimately brought about the idea of the stranger or other. Therefore, xenophobia, intended in its objective and subjective sense: is the fear of the stranger and the fear of being a stranger.
This paper will address the issue in a historical fashion while maintaining a conceptual focus on the philosophical theme of identity and pointing to the contemporary relevance of xenophobia.

As a first instance, in order to understand the conceptual ground from which xenophobia derives, the history and etymology of the concept will be traced back to Ancient Greek Culture where the word and the phenomenon originated (Curi, U. 2010; Cartledge, P. 2002; Harrison, T. 2002).

The leading thread throughout the paper will be the theme of identity, both in its strict philosophical sense and in its emotional sense. The sense of belonging to a group, a community, an ethnicity and a nation is what determines not only the social and political identity of every human being but also the emotional perception of personal identity. The fear of perceiving oneself as a stranger can be disruptive in society as much as the fear of the differences that a stranger brings to the minds of those who already inhabit that space. The emotions that are provoked by the recognition of “the difference” put into question and the identity on both sides of the confrontation means that the external perception of the identity and the internal perception of ones own identity are both triggered. Therefore, fear is provoked on both sides of the confrontation (Lorey, I. 2012).

Today, it is clear that xenophobia has had a strong impact on the personal and political as well as creating many effects on our private and emotional sensibilities as every form of fear appeals to our sense of pity. The contemporary relevance of this emotion will be shown by a reference to two examples: the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea and Trump’s propaganda against migration from Central America (Haider, A. 2018).

In conclusion, this paper will assert the necessity of revaluing and including a reflection on emotions in political theory (Ahmed, S. 2014). This will be elucidated by examining the ways in which a political discourse that embraces human emotion could help to challenge the social fear and anxiety which xenophobia creates. A positive emotional answer to xenophobia can be found precisely at the roots of this concept and consists in recuperating the value of hospitality as a distinctively Mediterranean and humanistic tradition (Curi, U. 2010).
Direct Perception and Expressivity in Social Cognition: How to Conceive Them?

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In recent years, defenders of a Direct Perception theory of social cognition (DP) have argued against two standard accounts in philosophy and cognitive sciences, namely Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). For instance, Gallagher maintains that, according to TT and ST, something more than perception is necessary for us to understand others (Gallagher 2008, 535). Perception does not seem to be smart enough and so some other cognitive machinery is mandatory for such approaches. On the contrary, defenders of DP argue that we can have direct perception of others’ minds and of their cognitive and affective states (Krueger 2012; Krueger & Overgaard 2012; Overgaard 2012). Krueger & Overgaard (2012) argue that some mental phenomena are directly given in perception through expressive behavior. Thus, we can directly perceive others’ mental states because, as Scheler says, in the encounter with others, we are not simply confronted with a mere body but with a psycho-physical “expressive unity” (Scheler 1923, 261).

One possible objection DP needs to face regards the possibility that the cognitive machinery TT and ST require is actually necessary at a sub-personal level. While such cognitive machinery is certainly useful, the aim of this work is to claim that it is not necessary every time we interact with others. Some basic encounters seem to be simpler than that, even in the hypothesis that such a machinery would be unconscious. Therefore, we will provide a definition and a theoretical account of “perception” and of the “expressive qualities” of the intentional object. Specifically, we will investigate the epistemological status of the intentional relation and the ontological and phenomenological status of the qualities enabling DP to overcome the objection mentioned above.

We will claim that expressive qualities can be considered as a peculiar kind of Gestalt structures that emerge from their elements but are neither ontologically reducible to nor epistemologically inferred by them. Expressive qualities, being a subset of Gestalt structures, are, as the latter, perceivable per se and are grasped before and often independently from focusing on their elements (Köhler 1929).

Therefore, expressive qualities can be grasped as a primary datum of perception and do not need to be inferred. However, in this framework, we need to accept a theory of
perception that grants that we can perceive not just low-level properties but also high-level ones.

References (selection)

**Rythmòs in Joint Actions: between rhythm synchronization and emotional attunement**

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In the contemporary debate on joint actions, a crucial issue is the possibility of reducing those uncertainty conditions that can undermine cooperation, mutual predictability between co-agents and, thus, the success of joint actions themselves (Michael and Pacherie 2015).

The main aim of this paper is to present a possible tool for reducing uncertainty in joint actions – namely *rythmòs* alignment (Zhok 2012). *Rythmòs* traits will be defined as those dynamical features of co-agents’ actions that, depending also on the way the latter are rhythmically structured, make actions displaying expressive features such as gentleness, nervousness, relaxation, anxiousness, and so on. *Rythmòs* alignment will then consist in the alignment of the expressive styles of the actions of co-agents. *Rythmòs* alignment will be presented as a dimension that stands between rhythm coordination and emotional attunement, which have been proposed as potential tools for improving joint actions stability and strengthening cooperation (Knoblich et al. 2011; Candiotto 2017). Indeed, I will argue that, because of their expressive connotations,
rythmòs occurrences are not simply rhythm occurrences, and rythmòs alignment is not just rhythm coordination. Moreover, the expressive qualities of actions are not already feelings or emotions, so that rythmòs alignment is not yet emotional attunement. However, as a specific dimension of synchronization, rythmòs alignment can be crucial to joint actions because it can constitute a prior level of coordination from which actual emotional attunement may emerge.

I will argue that, similarly to emotional attunement, rythmòs alignment might reduce uncertainty in joint actions since it can strengthen the rapport between co-agents and a sense of belonging to the group by creating a shared affective climate. I will argue that, in this way, it can be crucial especially in reducing uncertainty about co-agents’ dispositions and motivations towards a shared action and about co-agents’ sense of loyalty to the group’s interests and goals. This is also true in the case of negative affective traits/emotions. Let us think, for instance, of how aggressive gestures towards a rival (i.e. rythmòs traits of actions) can produce an aggressive climate in a group of people towards the rival group. This aggressive climate can lead to the emergence, in the members of the aggressive group, of actual affective states such as hate and anger against the opponent, binding the members of the group to one another and facilitating cooperation against a common ‘enemy’.

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Zhok, Andrea (2012), La realtà e i suoi sensi. La costituzione fenomenologica della percezione e l’orizzonte del naturalismo, Pisa: Edizioni ETS.
Philosophers, film theorists and psychologists have noted the rapid rise of awkwardness as both a recurring theme in pop culture and a feature of daily life in Britain and the US. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that awkwardness has received little attention in the literature, and is usually bundled together with embarrassment, anxiety, shame, and feelings of social exclusion or loneliness. The purpose of this paper is to draw on the existing work to develop an account of awkwardness which more precisely differentiates it from other, related emotions, and present a more specific account of the key features of situations which provoke awkwardness. It will be argued that awkwardness is an emotional response to situations in which the subject experiences an increased degree of uncertainty about how to act due to the inadequacy or violation of social norms, but is nevertheless strongly motivated to act, and there is a perceived possibility for a return to normality without significant loss of dignity or social standing. These claims will be defended by appeal to examples from literature and pop culture, and drawing primarily on the work of Clegg and Kotsko.

There is a broad consensus position in the literature that violation of social norms is the typical cause of awkwardness. On this basis, Kotsko argues that the present epidemic of awkwardness is the result of the slow and piecemeal decline of conservative, patriarchal social norms, and the refusal of liberal society to replace them with anything else. Kotsko’s account explains why awkwardness is a more prevalent emotion (in context) than outrage or indignation; but not why there should be any emotional response to the violation of norms which are, if Kotsko is correct, not taken terribly seriously. Clegg argues that awkwardness is a regulatory mechanism designed to promote social acceptance by cultivating an aversion to violation of social norms. The threat which produces the aversion is the possibility of being excluded; ostracism has a host of strongly negative consequences for individuals, in terms of their physical and mental wellbeing, and life prospects. Therefore, on Clegg’s view, the violation of even weak social norms merits an emotional response, because norm-violation carries the threat of being ostracised. It will be argued, however, that feeling awkward is not a response to a serious threat; the possibility of real harm typically prompts anxiety or fear.
Moreover, awkwardness can occur in situations where being ostracised is not a possibility, such as when watching awkward comedy.

The positive proposal of this paper, defended via close analysis of the Trump-Macron Bastille Day handshake, is that the driving force behind awkwardness is not a threat, but a sense of urgency, supplied by the increased cognitive and emotional burden of uncertainty, and the imminent possibility of a return to normality. That possibility can manifest as positively or negatively valenced, depending on whether the subject is motivated to re-establish existing social parameters or move to new ones (as when, for example, introducing greater intimacy into a relationship.) So awkwardness is a response to precarious, transitional social situations.

The Truth-Disclosing Function of Moods

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In this paper, I give an affirmative answer to the question of whether moods can reveal aspects of the truth. How could a pervasive mood fit within a theoretical account of human emotions as felt recognitions of significance, which are capable of representing the world more or less accurately? Although moods are not susceptible to being justified in quite the same way that an episode of anger, grief, fear, or pride might be, they can nonetheless be true to reality insofar as they make us aware of actual features of the world. Drawing on literature from philosophy and psychology, I address some frequently cited reasons for viewing moods or attunements as lacking intentional content altogether, or imposing a merely subjective coloration onto our surroundings. Indeed, there is some evidence showing that our general affective state of mind is likely to dispose us toward feeling certain emotions — those that are consonant with whatever mood we happen to be in. This does not, however, mean that our moods have a comprehensively distorting effect: on the contrary, the orientation which they provide us is precisely what allows certain aspects of our situation to be disclosed more vividly within our affective attention. Furthermore, the ways in which our bodily state may be conspicuous in a specific mood (or one that is typical or characteristic for us) can also harbor world-revealing potential. For reasons such as these, I think it should not be our default assumption that a mood is “about nothing.” This kind of assumption might lead us to imagine that a preference for pleasant rather than painful moods is as superficial a matter as a preference for sweet flavors over bitter ones — which would be yet another way to trivialize our affective experience,
by encouraging ourselves and others not to take it seriously. Moods are misunderstood if regarded as internal states projected by human beings onto the world, and (as I argue) so is the type of significant truth which is disclosed to us through our affective experience.

**Reactive emotions and Objective emotions: the case of anger and hatred**

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According to Strawson (1968), Participant Reactive Attitudes are attitudes belonging to involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships (e.g., guilt, indignation, resentment, etc.). Objective Attitudes, on the other hand, approach others as objects of social policy, as subjects for treatment, as "things" to be managed, handled, avoided, etc.

In the first part of the paper I will argue that Aristotle’s treatment of anger and hate can be understood along the lines of Strawson’s distinction between reactive and objective attitudes. In fact, as I will show, almost all the emotions Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric have a communicative intent. They are affective ways to call someone into question, to raise claims, to ask for justification, to challenge others and to respond to their challenges. As Aristotle claims in the Nicomachean Ethics, when anger is directed at injustice it can be morally justified; actually, according to this view, someone who does not get angry when others are unjustly treated is certainly to blame. In contrast with anger, hatred has no communicative intent for Aristotle. Those who hate, he argues, do not care if the other is aware of their feelings. They just wish bad things to happen to the other. Ideally, they would be happy if they ceased to exist. Ultimately, Aristotle’s description of hatred suggests that it is not an emotion but, rather, an affective disposition.

In the second part of the paper I will challenge the Aristotelian view in light of Aurel Kolnai’s analysis of hate. I will approach the issue from a dynamic perspective, and argue that hatred contains some of the inter-personal traits that are thought to characterize reactive attitudes.
The concept of inauthenticity as applied to emotion is normally understood in the academic literature as referring to two categories of emotional episodes; it refers to, either the way an emotion is brought about, or to its lack of ‘appropriateness’. As such, inauthentic emotions may be: a) emotions artificially induced by pharmacological means, or b) emotions which are not appropriate in the sense of lacking «diachronic coherence of a lived through or acted-out emotional history» or failing to be on par with «one’s internally justified values and beliefs» (Kraemer, [2009]).

I will argue that both notions of inauthenticity are misleading and inapplicable. Regarding the first, I will argue that emotions can be authentic even if induced pharmacologically. To the contrary, many cases in the relevant literature indicate that artificial means, sometimes, generate emotions which those having them, including mentally disordered patients, acknowledge as truly authentic. Moreover, the variety of substances that can alter our emotions is so wide, that practically, innumerable everyday emotions might count as inauthentic on this account of inauthenticity (e.g. an emotion triggered by a nice hot meal following months of strict diet). In addition, the second notion of inauthenticity as applied to emotion, implausibly rules out the idea of animals and newborns having authentic emotions, since animals and newborns cannot hold beliefs about their identities and core values. I will also refer to a third case, a thought experiment (Achim Stephan, [2009]) according to which a «new» emotion is invented in a lab (easygoing melancholy). Supposedly, it could be vetted for being not-genuine, because all «behavioural and mental reactions that specify its functional role are missing». My argument is that no «new» emotion has been invented, but we should merely speak of a variation of a preexisting emotion (e.g. very mild, tolerable sadness), or about preexisting emotions that co-occur. Furthermore, because easygoing melancholy can be simply felt as any other emotion can, and because the qualitative phenomenology of emotions is the only reliable indicator of authenticity and not their functional role, it mustn’t be seen as being «artificial through and through» and its authenticity should not be questioned.

I will conclude by advancing the claim that if emotions are simple affections comprising of a short set of feelings of a specific kind and are universal to cognitive and non-cognitive agents alike, then the quest for inauthenticity in emotion is a will-
Moods set the stage for a variety of human activities, enabling and facilitating, or obstructing and undermining our self-centred or other-regarding projects. Moods have, thus, a direct effect on the realisation of our intentions, setting limits on the potency of practical reason. However, what I am interested in is the rather more basic question as to whether moods themselves can be rational. In particular, I consider why the question about the rationality of moods is one that is rarely, if ever, posed. Books and articles on the rationality of emotions are currently an important part of the philosophical literature. Why is there no such corresponding interest in the rationality of moods?

We may think of that issue through an analogy with other mental types: doxastic states are or should be grounded on epistemic reasons, desiderative states are or should be grounded on normative -prudential or moral- reasons; are mood states in their turn grounded on some kind of epistemic, or practical, or even sui generis moody reasons? In the first part of the talk I shall look at the premises that informs the position that moods do not seem to be intentional states. I shall explore that issue in the context of the current debate over the representational content of affectivity. Secondly, I look at an account that sets moods as mechanisms whose function is to monitor the balance between the demands raised by our natural and social environment, and the physical or psychological resources we may expend in meeting those demands. That is a promising way to proceed in our exploration of mood states; it faces though some a formidable challenge when it comes to the phenomenology of mood experience. Finally I look at a theory according to which phenomenology provides the right methodological tools for making sense of the apparently diffuse and all-enveloping character of mood experience. That approach sets moods as the inescapable background of our perceptual, cognitive, and desiderative engagement with reality. I address the approach to moods as background feelings and raise some doubts about its ability to provide standards that would permit appraising the mood itself as rational.
Happiness, trauma, and resistance in Pablo Larrain’s No (2012)

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In the Chilean film, No (2012) we see a response to trauma that is oriented to ending the Pinochet military dictatorship (1973-1990) through the concept of happiness as a form of resistance. The film is part of an unplanned trilogy with the films Tony Manero (2008) and Post Mortem (2010), which focus on life during the military regime and the military coup respectively, while No presents the television campaign for the 1988 plebiscite on whether the Pinochet regime should stay as the government for eight more years (‘Yes’) or hold democratic elections (‘No’). My paper focuses on the film’s presentation of the trauma of the Pinochet regime and how it represents the transformation of that experience of trauma into prospective happiness and joy. The initial idea of the ‘No’ campaign was to portray the trauma and negative affects resulting from the abuses of the regime by showing images of brutality and torture. This approach is abandoned because of a determination to win the campaign. Instead of repeating the affects of past trauma expressing the emotional truth of life under Pinochet, the supporters of ‘No’ take up the challenge to ‘retemporalise and detranslate’ past affect and evoke instead the affect of happiness and joy in the prospect of an end to the Pinochet regime. This is an example of a transformative emotional narrative that Kristin McCartney finds in W.E.B. Du Bois’ articulation of the importance of slave or sorrow songs, a possibility that needs to be recognised, taken up, and recounted, to be effective. (2009) In the film the ‘No’ campaign, headed by the protagonist René Saavedra, a creative director in advertising, uses an idea expounded by Aristotle, that happiness is an intrinsic value—expressed through the slogan ‘Chile, joy is coming’ [Chile, la alegría ya viene]—and thus the best concept to appeal to a traumatised nation and galvanise them in favour of change. The resistant ‘No’ campaign portrays a possible future happiness if the regime were to end through the portrayal of joyful experiences. While the film has been criticised for over-simplifying events and leaving out the grassroots campaign to register and mobilise voters (Rohter, 2013; Khazan, 2013; Peirano, 2018), my interest is in the narrative of the film’s portrayal of the shift of attention from painful trauma to happiness as a form of resistance. Rather than seeing the film as a flawed how-to manual for ending dictatorships, my paper explores the importance of the symbolic transformation of emotion from a negative past orientation to a positive future one, and from individual suffering to a collective emotional experience of joy and happiness as a form of resistance.
Our emotions sometimes persist despite our better judgment. E.g., I may judge that I am in no danger of falling, but my fear of falling is not thereby dispelled. Sabine Döring believes that this phenomenon involves a ‘conflict without contradiction’ (CWC). In her paper, ‘The Logic of Emotional Experience: Noninferentiality and the Problem of Conflict Without Contradiction’, she regards the conflict between the emotion and the judgment as rational, not merely psychological, since it obtains between different representations of the world; but she also contends that it does not amount to a logical contradiction, since one does not have to give up the conflicting emotion or judgment, on pain of irrationality (2009, 240-41).

Döring claims that the possibility of CWC furnishes an important touchstone for ‘cognitive’ theories of emotion, which hold that the content of emotions is such as to be ‘made true’ by the facts (Ibid., 241). Indeed, if it is agreed that recalcitrance involves CWC, then the phenomenon of recalcitrance would seem to yield a reason to favor perceptual theories of emotion over judgmental theories, insofar as the latter appear difficult to reconcile with the idea that the conflict does not amount to a logical contradiction. Yet, unless we achieve a firm grasp of the idea of CWC, we cannot entirely discount reasons to doubt whether persistent emotions are really involved in this special kind of conflict. Alternatively, it may be that the conflict is not rational but merely psychological, or that, while being rational, it does amount to a logical contradiction after all.

Döring therefore provides an account of CWC, viz., by arguing that it is best explained by appeal to the peculiar attitudes and contents of emotional experiences (Ibid., 242). If successful, her argument would establish a qualified analogy between perception and emotion. I have begun this paper by bringing Döring’s view center-stage, since she sets up the problem that I will undertake to solve. I will proceed give an alternative account of CWC, viz., one that I take to be in some ways clearer and broader than hers. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The conflicts in question can be regarded as obtaining between different strands of evidence, and our perceptual and emotional experiences can be thus conflicted even among themselves, not only with judgments. A conflict that obtains between an
emotion and a judgment, and involves emotional recalcitrance, can thus be viewed as a special case that is best understood by recourse to the context that I have just described. I will develop this account of emotion, based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception, involving the well-known Husserlian ideas of perceptual fulfillment and disappointment, i.e., a kind of experiential confirmation and disconfirmation. However, the resultant account is by no means a rendition of Edmund Husserl’s ideas concerning emotions, but, rather, a kind of Husserl-inspired phenomenological view.

Intuitions are Epistemic Feelings. A Feeling Theory of Intuition

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This paper offers an answer to the question: “What kind of mental state are intuitions?” The answer consists in laying the groundwork for a “Feeling Theory of Intuition”. Its central claim is that intuition experiences are epistemic feelings. Together with bodily and emotional feelings, epistemic feelings belong to the class of affective experiences. Epistemic feelings are a rich and diverse family of affective experiences, comprising such feelings as the feeling of knowing and the feeling of familiarity. Crucially, among epistemic feelings we also find the feeling of rightness and wrongness whose specifically circumscribed varieties - the feeling of truth and the feeling of falsity -- are proposed to be identical with intuition experiences. The argument proceeds as follows: First, the target state is identified by outlining the largely phenomenal feature profile of intuition experiences found in the philosophical intuition literature. Second, some conceptual resources are put on the table that are usually employed to analyse affective experiences such as bodily and emotional feelings. Then, after providing a taste for some instances of epistemic feelings, it is argued that epistemic feelings are affective in nature. This enables the application of the provided conceptual resources to epistemic feelings. Taking this as a point of departure, two further epistemic feelings are introduced: the feeling of rightness and the feeling of wrongness. Finally, it is shown that some of these feelings, namely feelings of truth and feelings of falsity, fit the outlined feature profile of intuition experiences and are thus identical to them. In concluding, some epistemic and non-epistemic implications of the Feeling Theory are outlined.
During the last decade, a new, exciting paradigm has been developed in the field of philosophy of mind: Predictive Processing (PP, from now on) inverted our common and mainstream conception of perception, by claiming that, when we undergo a perceptual experience, we do not just receive inputs from the environment: what our brain actually does is to constantly predict the state of affairs we are going to perceive, and continuously compare our *expected state* with the *actual state* of the world. When a discrepancy between the two occurs, our brain tries to minimise the relevant *prediction error* either by updating the model in our brain (*perceptual inference*), or by changing the input (*active inference*).

This revolutionary framework was mainly conceived to deal with perceptual states, but during these last years, philosophers, neuroscientists, and cognitive scientists have tried to apply PP to other human experiences, such as time phenomenology (cf. Wiese, 2017), decision-making (cf. Burr, 2017), and, indeed, emotions (cf. Barrett, 2017; Hoemann, Gendron, & Barrett, 2017; Miller & Clark, 2018; Seth, 2013; Thornton et al., 2017).

The goal of this paper is to apply PP’s framework on emotions, by expanding on the account that Hohwy (2013) presented in his book. He mainly accounted for Feeling Theory of Emotions (cf. Prinz, 2004) i.e. emotions are feelings of bodily changes, as akin to perceptual inference. In the following discussion, I am going to argue that we can use another philosophical theory of emotions, the Motivational Theory of Emotions (Frijda, 1986; Scarantino, 2014) i.e. emotions are states of action readiness, as akin to active inference. I am going to dub these two processes, respectively, *felt* inference and *motivational* inference.

Starting with *felt* inference, when you apply PP to emotions, the main idea is that while perceptual experiences rely on exteroceptive cues (shapes, colours, textures...), affective predicted and actual states rely on interoceptive cues.

The case of *motivational* inference might sound a bit trickier: instead of updating our model until it matches the inputs, we can act, and adapt or change the inputs until they fit the expected state we have.

Once outlined my claim, I will show that one of the major payoffs of my account is that it allows us to reconcile the Feeling and the Motivational Theory of Emotions, usually considered rivals: because, as nicely summarised by Miller & Clark (2018:
2561), in the PP’s picture "perception and action are complementary manifestations of a single adaptive regime". Thus, through PP’s lens, feelings and motivations are going to be complementary manifestations of a single affective process.

References:
On the distinction between shame and guilt

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What is the difference between shame and guilt? A near consensus has arisen that guilt concerns what we do, is morally relevant, and quite possibly useful, whereas shame concerns us as persons, is morally irrelevant, and is largely unhelpful. Yet people usually report feeling both at the same time. And, like guilt, shame plays a relatively large role in morality across time and geographical locations. This suggests that a reexamination of the difference between the two emotions is in order. After presenting ‘the standard picture’, I turn to the psychological evidence. Much of that relies on a biased measure. Less biased evidence suggests a close connection between shame and guilt. Moving to philosophy, I deal with two critiques of shame: it is morally irrelevant and it is heteronomous. I show guilt shares the same features. We then look at dysfunctional manifestations of guilt that seem to mirror, pretty closely, dysfunctional manifestations of shame. In their extreme versions, then, both seem problematic. I end by arguing that the two emotions are much closer related than we are often led to believe. Nonetheless, they may be distinguished in the aspect of the regretted situation or action that is focused on (action vs. self), they feel somewhat differently, and although their motivations overlap to a large extent, guilt is still more likely than shame to result in reparative action. It is possible, however, that shame is more associated with long-term change. When it comes to their moral qualities, I argue that we are not yet in a position to be able to prefer one to the other.

Emotional entitlement

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We are entitled in holding beliefs even when we lack reasons or justification for them. Many cognitions that are useful for our daily life are like political rights (e.g. the right to vote.). People have them even when they do not know why and even when they are not able to justify them. A paradigmatic case is that of perceptions. We are normally entitled in trusting our perceptions in absence of defeaters. The entitlement persists even when we lack explicit justification for our perceptual experiences, as it often happens in perceptual cases. In such cases, entitlement persists even if we are “brains in a vat” (Dretske, 1981). The only condition is that we should behave as
epistemic responsible subjects, for instance by avoiding self-deception. Something similar happens when we consider self-evident propositions. We are entitled in holding self-evident propositions, even when understanding is lacking. That is true for self-evident propositions in general but even more for self-evident propositions in ethics. This account for the experience of children and intellectually weak people that, even though they do not have a capacity of adequately understanding self-evident propositions, they have the epistemic right to hold them. Particularly, we are entitled to hold self-evident propositions on the basis of our intuitions as much as we are entitled to hold perceptual beliefs on the basis of our perceptual experiences. Intuitions are for self-evident propositions what perceptions are for perceptual experiences.

What if emotions have an analogous role, that of conferring to our self-evident beliefs the aura of psychological immediacy and irresistibility that entitles us to trust our perceptions and our intuitions?

My thesis is that we are entitled by emotions only when emotions target self-evident principles. Following a long-lasting line of thought (e.g. Scheler, 1913; Dancy, 2014) for which moral intuitions can be paralleled to emotions I argue that to when emotions target a self-evident principle they are similar to seemings, namely the intellectual seeming that acknowledges the truth of the self-evident principle. The difference is that where an intuitional seeming acknowledges the truth of the principle, so an emotional seeming discloses the evaluative properties. As the intuitional seeming that acknowledges the truth of the principle is the result of a process of adequate understanding (Audi 2004), so the emotional seeming results from the process of correct understanding of the principle. If the emotional seeming is absent we would say that something is missing in the process of understanding. Moreover, being the result of a process of correct understanding, emotions constitute reasons that an epistemic responsible subject should take at face value.

In this case, the responsible epistemic subject has the epistemic right to hold the belief based on the emotional seeming. Epistemic responsible subjects could refuse to take their emotional seemings at face value, but they should take them at face value if those seemings are the result of the process of adequately understanding self-evident propositions. They are emotionally entitled to them by default.
Identity and Childhood Nostalgia
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Nostalgia, which comes from the Greek *nostos* (homecoming) and *algos* (longing), describes a bittersweet yearning for the past. This is a complex emotion that plays a fundamental role in the formation of the identities of both individuals and groups. The connection between political nostalgia and group identity, in particular, has received much attention. Most eminently, Boym (2001) has shown how what she calls *restorative nostalgia* (a particular kind of nostalgia that convinces the subject that the object of longing can be brought back) is at the very core of various reactionary and identity political movements. On the other hand, childhood nostalgia has received less attention despite the fact that it is felt by most people rather than only by those who are involved in politics, and thus, arguably shapes our identities as much as (if not more than) political nostalgia. In this paper, I will analyse childhood nostalgia to better understand how this emotion works and how it can shape our personal and group identities. In order to achieve this goal, I will draw from Boym’s theory and critique her distinction between restorative and reflective nostalgia by showing how childhood nostalgia does not fit neatly in this categorization but, rather, shares characteristics with both of these forms of longing. I will also relate concepts from cultural studies on nostalgia in contemporary mass media (e.g. Lizardi (2014); Jameson (1991)) and recent developments in psychology and philosophy of mind, especially affective scaffolding.

One might think childhood nostalgia to be a very personal emotion about fond memories of one’s youth. However, rather than as a recollection, we should think of it as a reconstruction—almost a rewriting of one’s past. Moreover this “rewriting” process is not the product of the subject alone; rather, it is deeply influenced by one’s social context. This is due to two main reasons. First, in childhood nostalgia, the subject does not deal with their memories alone but also with the collective memory of their own generation. Second, childhood nostalgia can be deeply influenced from the outside. As a matter of fact, nostalgia is not necessarily a spontaneous reflection on one’s memories, but it can also be triggered and influenced by external stimuli. This becomes apparent once we take in consideration examples from contemporary mass media and their relationship with nostalgia. I argue that these cultural phenomena and their impact on audiences can be better understood through Griffith’s and Scarantino’s (2009) idea that emotions can be diachronically scaffolded by the environment, that is to say that the environment (including material culture) supports
and shapes the acquisition of an emotional repertoire. I will also discuss whether in the case of nostalgia this process can be externally influenced in a way that can resemble what Slaby (2016) calls mind invasion. Nostalgia is a form of homesickness for a home that is no more and that probably never was. Be it spontaneous or influenced from the outside, childhood nostalgia operates a rewriting of one’s own narrative, creating a special relation between the subject and their past that goes beyond mere remembrance. As such, rather than telling us who we used to be, it reveals who we are now—both as individuals and as members of one’s own generation.

References

Shame, Plato’s Socrates, and the Divided Soul
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In his famous, inebriated speech in Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades distinguishes Socrates from all other human beings in terms of his ability to persuade his audience to embrace certain moral ideals, along with his unique ability to arouse in his interlocutors the feeling of shame. For Alcibiades the two go together, for it is precisely because Socrates stands as a moral exemplar that he is able to provoke in him such intense shame. Thus Socrates is a visible reminder to Alcibiades of his own moral deficiency, as he finds his own life to be unlivable as is and wishes that Socrates weren’t around any longer. In this way, Alcibiades illustrates two constitutive aspects of shame: on the one hand, the ideals—more or less articulate—in relation to which
one is found to be deficient in feeling shame; on the other hand, the specific audience before whom one is subject to this shame-inducing judgment of oneself. Of course, Alcibiades is not the only one who is made to feel shame in relation to Socrates. Alcibiades simply expresses most openly the shame dramatized throughout Plato’s texts, and indeed Plato’s Socrates relies upon his interlocutors having a sense of shame that can be provoked by philosophical questioning. Furthermore, in Plato’s Sophist shame is identified as an integral part of the morally transformative effect of philosophy. To be sure, this is not to say that Socrates merely leaves the interlocutors’ sense of shame unaltered, for often enough Socrates is concerned to reorient their sense of shame, to engage them in the work of revising or at least re-articulating the ideals implicit in their sense of shame—as we see most vividly in Plato’s Crito and Gorgias. In this way, Socrates’ philosophical activity can be understood as a matter, first, of exhorting his interlocutors to live in accord with their moral ideals on pain of feeling shame, and, at the same time, of working toward making their sense of shame rationally autonomous—that is, responsive to rational scrutiny and revision, so that shame directs them toward the virtuous and properly reflective way of living their lives.

Plato’s Socrates is thus committed to the view that shame is not ‘unreflectively conservative’ as some theorists (e.g. Lamb, Kekes, Saxonhouse) have argued, since it allows for some degree of rational critique and autonomy. On the other hand, Plato’s focus on psychological conflict within individuals like Alcibiades and Callicles attests to an awareness that human beings may have sources of shame within their psyches that are not only resistant to rational critique, but may preclude the inner unity and harmony of soul that Socrates presents as the ultimate aim of his philosophical activity. This awareness in Plato’s thought can be brought into fruitful dialogue with contemporary theorists on the possibility of shame’s radical heteronomy (e.g. Dilham and Wollheim). I argue that the fundamental importance of shame for Plato’s Socrates cuts across the prevalent understandings of ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’ in moral philosophy.

Fellow Feeling, Understanding and Acknowledgment
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The current discussion on empathy and empathetic emotions is primarily focused on the idea that these play an important epistemic role. That is to say that many theorists
suppose that the job of empathetic emotions is to detect or register something about anothers’ psychological condition: they are ways of coming to know about their emotions and feelings. Relatedly, empathetic emotions are thought to promote understanding in virtue of playing this epistemic role. That is, they promote understanding of other people in virtue of what they register or detect about their psychological condition. In this talk, I argue that empathetic emotions play a different role. Focusing on cases of feeling with another (fellow feeling, Mitfühlen), I argue that they constitute a form of participation in or involvement with another’s psychological condition, which I explicate in terms of a specific form of acknowledgment. This claim, which is inspired by Scheler (1923), is different from the claim that they constitute a way of coming to know of it. In contrast to awareness or knowledge of something, acknowledging something is a response which presupposes some awareness or knowledge of it. To say that some mental attitude or action is a response to x is to say that x is a reason for which it is held. It is crucial in this context that reasons for which we feel (believe desire etc.) – also called motivating reasons – are distinguished from causes. Many causes are not motivating reasons: that I slept badly may be a cause of my being angry at someone, but it is typically not the reason for which I am angry at her. I argue for the claim that fellow feelings constitute a form of acknowledgment by calling attention to their responsive character: feeling with another is a specific way of responding to their psychological condition. I finally address the question whether the type of acknowledgment constitutive of fellow feelings contributes to understanding others. I argue that it does not. I suggest that this does not make them any less interesting or valuable, though. Fellow feelings are valuable in virtue of being a specific form of acknowledgment of others.

A moral potential in negative affect? Implicit bias and discomfort
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It can be profoundly unsettling to realize that one harbors implicit biases that conflict with one’s explicit beliefs. In this paper, I discuss two normative strategies for how to tackle discomfort in conversations about implicit bias. Discomfort advocates argue that there is progressive moral potential in discomfort, emerging from the compunction that liberals and egalitarians feel when they realize they harbor implicit biases. The strongest voices even believe we have a duty to make people uncomfortable by calling attention to their biases. Discomfort skeptics, on the other
hand, warn that such a strategy is not only morally unjustifiable but also counterproductive. They argue that we should avoid blame and discomfort when discussing implicit bias.

Across the spectrum of voices in this debate, we find the problematic assumption that discomfort can be managed, controlled or prescribed in the right doses to achieve moral progress. Both sides thereby underestimate the paramount, often unpredictable influence that affect (and especially negative affect like discomfort) has on our judgments, behavior and understanding of the world. Drawing on Lisa Barrett’s constructivist theory on emotions and affective states, I critique this assumption and argue that we need a more critical discussion of what “moral work” we can expect discomfort to perform in conversations about implicit bias.

The advocates, for example, argue that feelings of discomfort are morally productive because they prompt moral feelings of shame and guilt. But behind this idea is an assumption that there is straightforward way to make discomfort intelligible, that it is possible to discern and dissect why we feel discomfort and that this process will elevate our consciousness. This argument, however, underestimates the extent to which context shapes an agent’s interpretation of affect and simple, raw feelings. By context, I mean the concrete situation of the agent, but also the moral and political principles that she employs to discern and interpret the meaning of her affect. Rudimentary affect like discomfort does not necessarily have a transparent, straightforward intentionality. The moment an agent begins to interpret the discomfort (by calling it “compunction”, “shame” etc.), it is given cognitive content, meaning, and intentionality. In this process there can be multiple, competing interpretations of what discomfort signifies in a given situation. Depending on the context, the agent may also interpret the discomfort over the implicit biases as a response to an unpleasant surprise or a feeling of justified anger, disbelief or distrust. Discomfort is an affective state that we want to overcome. Whatever the cause of or reason for the discomfort, the impulse is to get rid of the feeling and avoid it in the future. At its core, discomfort—as other aversive feelings like disgust—prompts us to self-centered strategies of avoidance. As a result, we tend to lose sight of the potentially deep reasons for feeling uncomfortable. Conversations on implicit bias are a striking example of this phenomenon.
Philosophers of emotion often say they aim to formulate a ‘general theory of emotion’ (Deonna & Teroni 2012; Solomon 2008). Over the course of her career, Amélie Rorty has made several criticisms of the idea of creating a settled ‘general theory of the emotions’ in which emotions are understood as natural kinds that can be easily distinguished from each other and other states of mind (1980a; 1980b; 1982; 2004). Her central points are that, because such theories develop in the context of various philosophies of mind, psychology, and science, general theories of emotion do not have a way of legitimising themselves outside of their historical philosophical context and that such theories are constructed through tactics of “species qualification” and conceptual “gerrymandering” (Rorty 2004: 272). In sum, aiming for a true general theory of emotion is futile in both science and philosophy. Her argument here is part of a larger argument for what has been called (by others) Rorty’s ‘narrativist’ account of emotions (Morag 2016).

In this paper, I want to look at Rorty’s sceptical argument to see what implications her argument would have for the philosophy of emotions and affective scientific research today. I argue that if she is correct, then contemporary emotion research would have serious problems with its conceptual framework and validity. If her criticisms are valid, contemporary researchers ought to be concerned. I argue that, while her account of how theories have previously been constructed is insightful and has important lessons to teach, her claim that all attempts at general emotion theory are futile is overstated. Firstly, her argument is based on several claims that are questionable. For example, it relies on a reading of the history of philosophy of mind where she argues that different concepts of mind are totally and radically irreconcilable and makes historically questionable claims about theoretical baggage of terms like ‘passion’, ‘affect’, and ‘emotion’. Secondly, I aim to show that Rorty’s account of conceptual ‘gerrymandering’ is overly broad and could be applied to any attempt to make a distinction between things. Thirdly, I aim to argue that her argument is not as applicable to more recent accounts of emotion in affective science, like the competing appraisal and constructivist theories (Scherer 2009), and recent accounts in philosophy of emotion, like the ‘attitudinal’ (or ‘modal’) theory (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Teroni; 2017).
According to the judgment theory of emotion, emotions necessarily involve evaluative judgments. My fear of a wild animal, on this view, involves the judgment that the wild animal is dangerous or threatening. Similarly for other emotions such as sadness or anger: my being sad upon receiving some news involves the judgment that the event it reports constitutes a great loss and my anger at someone’s remark involves the judgment that the remark is offensive in some way. The judgment view enjoys a great deal of historical popularity, dating back to important philosophical figures such as Aristotle and the Stoics, and dominating a large chunk of 20th century thinking on the
emotions. It is fair to say that, up until recently, it was the standard philosophical theory of emotions.

Despite its historical popularity, however, the judgment view is almost universally held to be dead, for a very simple reason: it is overly intellectualistic. In particular, an important case of emotion threatens any view of emotion that requires judgment or any other attitude apparently requiring the possession of evaluative concepts, namely the case of emotions primarily felt by non-human animals and young children (Deigh, 1994, Morreall, 1993, Tappolet, 2016). Let’s call the emotions, if any, that do not involve evaluative judgments (or any other cognitively demanding evaluative attitude) animal emotions, keeping in mind that these may be experienced by non-human animals and human beings alike. The problem for the judgment theorist – which I call the problem of animal emotions – is that her view seems to lack the resources to accommodate animal emotions.

In this paper, I argue that the judgment view is best conceived as restricted to a special class of emotions – which I call reflective emotions – which contrast with animal emotions in some important respects. The distinction between animal and reflective emotions, I argue, is both (i) independently supported and (ii) accounted for (at least in part) by the claim that the evaluative state involved in emotion can take various forms. Views that take emotion types to involve only one kind of evaluative state, therefore, should be rejected. This, I suggest, opens the door to a version of the judgment view – one that can arguably be extracted from the writings of recent judgment theorists themselves – that characterizes reflective emotions, in contrast with animal emotions, as those emotions that involve evaluative judgments. The properties of judgment, on this proposal, explain the difference between animal and reflective emotions in a plausible way. Although none of the steps of the argument should be seen as conclusive, it should become clear that no response as easy and devastating as the problem of animal emotions is commonly thought to be is now available to the detractors of the judgment view. Not only that, detractors will have to grapple with some neglected issues – such as the possibility of a pluralistic account of emotional evaluations and the plausibility of the animal vs. reflective distinction – in the course of showing that their alternative view should still be preferred to the judgment view.
The main purpose of our project is to clarify the function of disgust as one of the factors of discriminations and social exclusions such as hate speech, and to propose necessary measures to tackle with such serious social issues. As the first step in this direction, we focus on the difference of two types of disgust. There are various types of stimuli that evoke disgust, from unsanitary object to immoral behavior which result in social exclusions (Olatunji & McKay, 2008). The former is considered to evoke core disgust, a direct physical emotion that fulfills a defensive function of avoiding and excluding offensive and harmful objects (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). On the other hand, the latter is related to moral disgust, involving complex appraisals including observation of social norms. It is evoked by the actions which deviate from the norm functioning to regulate moral behavior (Vicario, Rafal, Martino, and Avenanti, 2017). While the emotions are classified in the same category (i.e., disgust), there may be variations in the subjective experiences and in facial expressions of the emotions depending on the evoking situations. According to the component process model of emotion (CPM: Scherer, 1984), organisms have a set of criteria for appraising information obtained from both internal and external environments. As a sequentially cumulated result of appraisals, a specific pattern of physiological, functional, and expressive reactions is generated. At the same time, we experience a specific emotion or emotions as a result of the specific appraisal outcomes. According to CPM, the combination of appraisal checks may differ depending on the types of disgust (i.e., Scherer, Mortillaro, & Mehu, 2003). Core disgust can be predicted to occur primarily based on physical and intrinsic displeasure. In the case of moral disgust, norm compatibility as well as intrinsic displeasure and high coping potential are suggested to be important. Further, these appraisals are considered to be related to the activations of the muscles around mouth such as depressor labii and orbicularis oris particularly in the latter, whereas the former is related to the activations of corrugator supercilii in addition to the muscles around mouth such as depressor anguli oris. In order to understand the nature of disgust and the related emotions, and their conceptual structures, this study aims to explore and to analyze the characteristics of...
feelings and facial expressions observed in the hypothetical situations evoking different types of disgust by using semi-structured interview and facial EMGs. Thirty-three female Japanese college students participated in this study. The participants were presented a series of scenarios describing situations evoking different types of disgust and some other emotions. In reading/watching each scenario, participants were asked firstly to pose facial expressions supposed to express in such a situation, and then, to report how they feel in the situation and to name the feeling. Participants’ facial EMGs, the activities of corrugator and zygomatic major were recorded while posing the expressions. As the preliminary results, we found a significant difference between EMGs recorded in the scenarios of core disgust and those recorded in the moral disgust evoking scenarios. Further analyses of EMGs and self-reports will reveal the possibility that the different patterns of facial muscle activities correspond with the different set of appraisals of core and moral disgust.

The nature of emotions: The integrated dynamic pattern theory

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In the metaphysical debate we have two extreme positions: emotions are individuated as social constructs (Lutz 1986, Harré 1986), on the one hand, or they are individuated as evolutionary anchored affect programs (Ekman 1972, Griffith 1997), on the other. Both accounts have severe deficits. Let us mention only the two main deficits: psychoevolutionary accounts state that shared evolutionary history is the only criteria to identify types of emotions. They do not provide any classificatory schemes which do not refer to each category’s evolutionary history but for many emotion categories referred to not only in everyday speech but also in psychological theories, it is far from clear whether their members share the same evolutionary history. In principle, psychoevolutionary accounts of emotions can easily account for basic emotions but have problems to account for the role of cognitive contents in so-called cognitive emotions. On the other hand, the social constructionist can easily account for the latter including the cultural variety of emotion phenomena but they underestimate the strong overlap of the emotion repertoire despite the cultural variation. Here Ekman (1972) has shown that basic emotions like joy, fear, anger, sadness etc. are accompanied with the same facial expression. The evolutionary anchor of basic
emotions constraints our emotion repertoire and undermines the social constructivist view that emotions are entirely created by cultural factors. What could be an alternative? We need to do justice to both features, the evolutionary anchor of basic emotions and the cultural dependence of some emotions. We argue that emotions are individuated as integrated dynamic patterns of characteristic features (which mostly not necessary but only characteristic features). The pattern theory of emotion will be unfolded (distinguished from component theories like those from K. Scherer) and it will be shown that it is coming with several important advantages which includes the following: pattern can easily involve both, evolutionary anchored as well as culturally shaped features and thus account for both observations. Secondly, the pattern theory of emotion is a theoretical framework that does not run into the main problems of a feeling theory of emotion (not accounting for cognitive aspects of some emotions) nor of cognitive theories of emotions (to underestimate the bodily and evolutionary basis of emotions). Thirdly, the integrated dynamic pattern theory of emotions offers a convincing framework to analyze emotion recognition: emotion recognition of basic emotions takes place as a direct perception and this can be explained as cases of pattern recognition. Emotion recognition of complex emotions needs an access to emotions which is going beyond perceptual access but this can also be nicely combined with the pattern theory of emotions. Thus, it will be argued that the integrated pattern theory of emotions is an adequate theoretical framework to understand emotions.

Emotional skillfulness and virtue acquisition

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Several authors have recently offered accounts of moral habits claiming that, despite they are non-deliberative and largely constituted by automatic processes, they can count as intelligent and bring about virtuous – or moral – overt actions, after a history of practice and repetition (e.g. Pollard 2003; Snow 2006; Sauer 2018). In arguing for this thesis, they mostly focus on the underlying reasons for action and on the long-term goals encompassed by habits, holding that it is the rationality of such reasons and goals that, in turn, makes the related automatic processes intelligent. According to this picture, then, automatic processes count as intelligent when they are brought in line with reasons and goals provided by moral reasoning.
These explanations, however, seem to obliterate the emotional component of habits, as well as to conceive them in purely intellectualist ways. This, in turn, amounts to a psychologically untenable dualistic hierarchical view of the mind, with cognitive functions at the vertex of an alleged pyramid (De Caro – Marraffa 2015).

In this paper, our focus will be on emotions as key-components of the automatic processes involved in moral habits. According to virtue theory, virtues are complex dispositions towards the good (*hexis*) involving action, attention, thought and *emotions* (Kristjánsson 2018). In particular, according to the skill model of virtues acquisition, moral development is conceived as the result of repetition and learning of a complex set of sub-components, a process in which emotion-shaping plays a major role (Stichter 2018).

We will offer an account of skillful emotions in virtue acquisition, so as to argue for the existence of skillful emotions that are intelligent despite their automaticity (Fridland 2014) and represent the emotional components of the virtues.

In order to defend our thesis, we will define skillful emotions by spelling out their features and contrasting them with those listed by rival descriptions. In particular, we will claim that skillful emotions are:

i. Open to differentiation, rather than modular;

ii. Spontaneous, rather than impulsive;

iii. Cognitively penetrable rather than isolated affective states;

iv. Transferrable and flexible to new contexts.

After offering this re-definition, we will show how our account of skillful emotions improves the description of emotion-shaping in virtue acquisition, making sense of how emotional reactions gradually become automatic despite preserving and even increasing their intelligence.

References


Meta-emotions: between emotions and virtue

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Much has been said about virtue and emotion respectively, but little about their intrinsic connection. The concept of meta-emotions may help to bridge the gap. As Goldie has shown, emotions are not isolated, static elements of a somehow material construction. To quote famous titles by Peter Hacker, “The Passions” are connected to “The Intellectual Powers”, which together make up “Human Nature”. Importantly, ‘emotions’, ‘passions’, or ‘energies of the soul’, are malleable. The concept of meta-emotions fits in well with this view. But how is it that an emotion is turned into a meta-emotion (where “meta” doesn’t only refer to the reflexivity of an emotion insofar it is always accompanied by self-awareness)?

Dina Mendonça (to whose paper “Emotions about Emotions”, in Emotion Review 5, 2013, 390-396, I am indebted) gives a hint when she analyses a situation of getting “angry with yourself for being angry”, modifying an example from Goldie. This self-referential anger is not yet a new quality. But there is a way out of the vicious circle: when anticipating that to keep being angry at being angry is ridiculous, a new emotion comes about, “making you laugh at yourself”. Thus a new insight teaches you to see your anger in another light, and to lessen its weight. The meta-emotion of laughing at one’s own anger is no mechanism, but the fruit of an intellectual operation which helps to shape a new emotion.

This situation is similar to what Augustine pointed out in his paradoxical formula “the sinner should feel pain about his sin, and joy about this pain”. This is a case of meta-emotion, or even of meta-meta-emotion, because a) the sinner has had a strong first-order emotion – e.g. the victorious feeling of Don Giovanni upon seducing a married woman successfully. Of course the real Don Giovanni would remain unfazed, but if he b) comes to acknowledge what he really did – if he begins to see his experience not only from the side of the seducer, but also from the standpoint of the victim – he might change his attitude. By giving to his past experience its real value, he might feel pain, repentance. c) Now a second meta-level (similar to the laughter about the anger about the anger) appears: having felt the due repentance, the sinner should enjoy this new condition. He is supposed to do so, because the burden of sin has been taken away.
from him. (In a more detailed form of this paper, there would be space for a glimpse at Scheler’s theory of repentance.)

Repentance is an example of an act rather than of a habit (as virtue is). Meta-emotions have at least these traits in common with virtue (in the Aristotelian sense): they reshape our emotional energies; they arise under the influence of our rational powers; by connecting the two, they come close to what Aristotle, when developing his theory of virtue, named “orektikos nous, or orexis noetike”, that means a combination of the two fundamental powers of mind.

Looking on the Bright Side or Hiding Your Emotions: Problems with emotion regulation studies

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The empirical literature on emotion regulation generally accepts that cognitive reappraisal—a strategy that involves reinterpreting one’s situation by taking a broader view or ‘looking on the bright side’—is the most effective form of emotion regulation. Several empirical studies seem to support this view (Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Goldin et al., 2008; Opialla et al., 2015), finding that cognitive reappraisal reduces self-reported negative affect (Eippert et al., 2007; Gross, 1998a, 2002; McRae et al., 2010; McRae et al., 2011; Ray et al., 2010) and amygdala activation (Eippert et al., 2007; Gross, 1998; Kalisch, 2009; S. H. Kim & Hamann, 2007; Ray et al., 2010; Urry et al., 2009).

However, this paper argues that the literature is laboring under a mistaken notion of effectiveness in emotion regulation and these studies suffer as a result. The very question of which emotion regulation strategy is better than another is ill-formed. It overlooks the fact that different strategies for regulating emotion aim at regulating different aspects of emotional appropriateness.

According to my view, there are three major features in respect of which an emotion can be inappropriate: (1) expression (verbal, facial, or action expression doesn’t serve the person’s well-being); (2) intensity (too intense/too weak); (3) type of emotion (joy, sorrow, fear, etc.). Different regulatory strategies aim at ameliorating different kinds of appropriateness failures. The effectiveness of the regulatory strategy ought to be evaluated according to which kind of inappropriateness it was aiming at.

The studies claiming that cognitive reappraisal is the most effective form of emotion regulation compare its regulatory efficacy with that of expressive suppression (curbing the verbal or behavioral expression of emotion, not ‘showing your emotion’).
This is a mistake. Unlike cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression isn’t aimed at reducing or eliminating emotion. It aims instead at changing, reducing, or eliminating emotion expression by curbing expressive behavior. Hence we should not be surprised to find that expressive suppression is less effective than cognitive reappraisal at cutting emotional episodes short. This is not what expressive suppression seeks to do, and it ought to be evaluated for effectiveness according to its particular aims.

This paper’s diagnosis is that the empirical literature is generally operating under the assumption that reason and emotion are at odds. Since the aim of cognitive reappraisal reduce or truncate an emotion, clearing the way for the uninterrupted functioning of reason, the literature is predisposed to see this strategy as the most effective form of emotion regulation. Moreover, cognitive reappraisal is associated with prefrontal regions associated with cognitive control processes (Kalisch, 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2005), which in these researchers’ views aligns cognitive reappraisal with reason. But this view of the effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies strips emotion of its important epistemic role and risks regulating away the insights that emotions offer. In light of this, I propose an improved notion of regulatory effectiveness that is sensitive to the different aspects of emotional appropriateness and respects emotions’ epistemic value.

Nudity and the Joy of Feeling Virtuous

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I would like to probe the joy of feeling virtuous, specifically, what happens to that joy when one is naked. I approach the study through classical philosophical texts and especially through Aaron Ben-Ze’ev’s seminar work The Subtlety of the Emotions. I focus on American sensibility and its European roots in art. I take as axiomatic Leo Steinberg’s contention (The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Painting and in Modern Oblivion, 1997) that sixteenth-century Protestants ended or at least significantly curtailed prevailing Catholic permissive attitudes toward nudity. In Italian paintings until the mid-sixteenth century, it is common to see the penis of the Christ child and even the exposed breast of a Madonna nursing her child. Reflecting the morals of the society in which it is produced, art comprises at least painting, drawing, sculpture and photography. Nudity may have always been a part of Western art; in any event, it has played a significant role for a very long time. The
Renaissance only magnified that role. According to conventional wisdom, the Renaissance revived classical antiquity and themes drawn from classical mythology. You might think that nudity is nudity, but no. What makes nudity in art so fascinating is that people have to interpret nudity and then present it. That’s why there are so many different—and sometimes contrasting—depictions of nudity in art.

A photo replicates perspective which is considered the hallmark of a realistic image. But perspective is very much a post-Renaissance convention of realism that has been the focus of much literary experiment and critique. The point is there is no easy and natural relationship between reality and its depiction.

Rugby men calendars, Calvin Klein underwear ads, ubiquitous pornographic images challenge impressionable young people trying to lead what they consider to be a virtuous life to understand what one forfeits morally when one disrobes. For many decades, American students have been required by schools to shower with their classmates in sex-segregated locker rooms after gym class. Recent court cases in the states of North America and Virginia (concerning the alleged right of trans students to shower in locker rooms of their choosing) have forced Americans to rethink what it means to be seen naked. The Renaissance comfort with the body does not characterize American culture today, broadly speaking.

The rise of the Renaissance nude across Europe was intimately bound up with Christian imagery and spiritual practice, specifically the yearning to behold the tangible indicators of Christ’s humanity and of the heroism and struggles of biblical figures and the saints. The body itself, epitomized in the nudes of Michelangelo and Raphael, has been viewed as the locus of a wholesale transformation, not only in the visual arts but also in the broader cultural imagination through humanist ideals that heroize “man” and exalt human thought and achievement. As such, the idealized male form became an expression of inner virtue and even of cosmic order. Not so today, as the emotions of fear and joy have shifted in ways deserving scholarly notice.

**Aesthetic Experience: A Challenge to Emotion Theory**

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A central theme in the philosophy of art is the question how to understand the relation between emotion and aesthetic experience. If we agree that there is something like a distinct emotional response to art - what kind of an emotional experience is it, how exactly is it triggered? In my talk I consider two positions on the subject. At one
extreme of the spectrum is the ‘romantic’ claim - defended e.g. by Jenefer Robinson (2005) - that all art is the expression of emotion and appreciating art requires that we somehow emotionally empathize with the art work. At the other extreme is the ‘modernist’ idea that there are no necessary connections between appreciating art and emotional states (like enthusiasm, excitement, thrill) aroused by the art object—emotion is inessential. I will focus on the case of literature and argue for a third position: empathic emotion (‘Einfühlung’) does play an important role in appreciating art, but there exist important differences between aesthetic and empathic experience that have been overlooked by aesthetic expressivists thus far, and are not accounted for by contemporary emotion theories; these differences constitute what art is about.

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In the Beginning There Was Phthonos: A Short Historical Introduction to Envy
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Envy can be found in all ages, with all genders, and in all strata of the society. It is a panhuman phenomenon, whose disquieting traces can be found everywhere in human history and culture. All human religions condemn envy, and most peasant and tribal societies share the superstition of the evil eye, a destructive power emanating—usually involuntarily—from the look of an envious person. Notwithstanding its ubiquitousness, envy has only recently started to be discussed by contemporary philosophers. However, we can find it analyzed insightfully
throughout the history of philosophy, in ways that are often psychologically nuanced and prescient of current empirical evidence. In this talk, I present a short history of envy in the Western philosophical tradition. Rather than attempting a comprehensive and systematic review of all the views on envy in the history of philosophy, I review contributions that are most relevant to the contemporary debate, and I focus on Ancient, Medieval and Modern times, starting with Plato and ending with Kant. What the talk lacks in completeness it gains, I hope, in simplicity and cohesion.

I start by surveying envy in the Ancient Greek tradition, in particular in Plato’s analysis of malicious envy in the Timaeus and the Philebus, Aristotle’s discussion of both phthonos (malicious envy) and zelos (benign or emulative envy/emulation) in the Rhetoric, and Plutarch’s analysis of hatred and envy in the homonymous De Invidia et Odio. I show how many of Aristotle’s and Plutarch’s observations are supported by current psychological studies.

I then move to the Christian tradition, focusing especially on Basil of Caesarea, Augustine, Gregory the Great and Aquinas. These theologians greatly contributed to envy’s negative reputation and its being categorized as a capital vice or cardinal sin, that is, a sin from which many other sins sprout.

By the end of the Middle Ages, the characteristics of envy, the conditions in which it arises, the kind of behaviors it motivates, the dispositions it is associated with, and its difference with cognate emotions like emulation, resentment and schadenfreude have all been discussed and identified by one author or other. And yet, the modern philosophers’ reflections on envy are both rich and diverse, bringing to light novel concerns and perspectives.

I argue that there are three ways in which the modern thinkers stand out compared to their predecessors. First, authors such as Descartes, Bacon, Spinoza, Rousseau, and, above all, Hume go further in identifying the underlying psychological mechanisms of envy, insofar as they investigate the role played by comparison and imitation. Second, they (especially Bacon, Hobbes, Mandeville, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Kant) distinguish between the personal and the political sphere, and realize that the individual and the collective domains are not isomorphic as the ancients believed. Third, and in connection with the first two themes, the moderns’ critique of envy becomes more qualified and sophisticated, and often explicitly connected to a systematic view of human nature, human values and moral education.
Distinguishing the Phenomenal from the Cognitive

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The divide between identifying emotions with either the feeling aspects or the cognitive aspects “is one of the major fault lines within emotion research” (Prinz 2004: 22). Whereas feeling theories take the phenomenal aspects to be at the core of emotions, cognitivists argue that emotions are conceptualized in order to explain the representational properties of emotions, and thus believe that they are reducible to (or at least based on) judgments or some other cognitive states. Fascinating as the debate between feeling theories and cognitive theories may be, its motivation hinges largely on there being a lack of conceptual sophistication to separately pick out the feeling aspects and the cognitive aspects of the emotions. Imagine for a moment that instead of having a single concept of happiness that refers to the emotional state of happiness simpliciter, we would be in possession of two different concepts, happiness1 referring to the experiential or feeling aspects of happiness, and happiness2 referring to the cognitive aspect, i.e. a propositional attitude that in conjunction with an intentional object expresses an evaluative judgment. Now, most philosophers readily assume that people possess just a single concept of happiness, anger, sadness, etc. Others, e.g. Peter Hacker, have explicitly pointed out that “there is no difference between having an emotion and feeling an emotion (being jealous and feeling jealous)” Hacker (2009: 18). Unfortunately, no reason is given to support this conjecture.

In order to test whether people distinguish the phenomenal from the cognitive aspects of emotions, we conducted two studies. We started with a corpus analysis on the world-wide web in order to look for differences in the use of the expressions ‘feeling x’ and ‘being x’. The results are displayed in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Ratio of the amount of being-talk vs feeling-talk on the world-wide-web for cases in which an intentional content of the emotion is specified (left) and in which a cause of the emotion is highlighted.

The results of the web-based corpus analysis of emotion terms demonstrate the falsity of Hacker’s claim that there is no difference between having an emotion and feeling an emotion. English speakers primarily use ‘being happy’, ‘being sad’, as well as ‘being angry’ when they refer to an emotional state that is directed at an intentional object, i.e. an evaluative judgement, whereas they state more often that they ‘feel happy’, ‘feel sad’, and ‘feel angry’ when an external event has caused them to be in an emotional state.

In a second experiment, we directly asked 119 participants to read one of two scenarios in which it was specified that a person named Tom

i. evaluated a situation as dangerous but did not experience any uneasiness. [cognitive]

ii. did not evaluate a situation as dangerous but experienced uneasiness. [feeling]

The participants were then prompted to select one of the following four response options: “Tom is afraid.”, “Tom feels afraid.”, “Both of the above.”, “Neither/Other”. The data, displayed in Figure 1 below, confirmed the results we obtained in the corpus analysis. A majority of the participants who were assigned to condition (i) selected either “Tom is afraid” or “Neither”. In contrast, a majority of the participants who were drawn to condition (ii) thought “Tom feels afraid” made the most sense. Importantly, only a minority selected “Both of the above” in any of the two conditions.
In sum, the results strongly suggest that, pace the philosophical consensus, people seem to distinguish between the phenomenal and the cognitive aspects of emotions.

References:
On How to Understand the Moral Work of Emotions
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The moral work of emotions finds expression in spontaneous first-order assessments of actions, persons and situations. Although spontaneous assessments can become doubtful later on, as soon as additional information is available, it nonetheless is an indispensible guide to understanding and responding to the affordances of given situations. The accuracy of this response hinges upon adequately taking into account subject-relative and context-dependent aspects. This being so, it seems, however, that acknowledging the moral function of emotions strongly speaks in favor of consulting empirical research (e. g. on the psychological constitution of subjects, or the structure and outcome of social interaction). In particular, philosophers have to explain how one can take seriously these bottom-up requirements of a morality of emotions without giving up the claim that emotions play an important role for constituting an ethical theory, which goes beyond particular cases and contexts.

This paper is meant to do clarificatory and constructive work in this field. Its starting-point is our everyday emotional practice, which entails prima facie ascriptions of positive or negative quality to a large variety of emotions. For instance, love or gratitude are considered positive emotions whereas envy or meanness portray negative emotions. Any promising attempt to understand the morality of emotions, firstly, has to distinguish between i) assessing objects (persons, actions) by means of undergoing (and expressing) certain emotions; ii) assessing those who (habitually) show positive or negative emotions. Entering research on i), it is crucial to explain what “appropriateness” of emotional responses means. Dwelling on ii) raises the issue of how emotions and virtues or vices are related to one another. Secondly, a philosophical investigation of the morality of emotions will endeavor to separate contingent from non-contingent factors. To some extent, prima facie ascriptions of positive or negative quality depend on contingent circumstances like cultural variations. Yet it is reasonable to assume that they also depict the nature or immanent character of the emotions at issue. While those who advocate strong relativism in ethics argue that there are no non-contingent aspects left, their opponents insist on what one may designate the “internal anchoring view” (IAV) on an emotionally based morality. The present paper tackles with the following question: How is it possible to acknowledge the subject-related and context-dependent aspects of emotions functioning in terms of i) while nonetheless sticking to IAV? Answering this question requires embarking on a two-step proce-dure: a) One has to do fine-grained
descriptive work in analyzing specific emotions and utilize the results for b) drawing up a system of inhibiting conditions, which focus on moral-sensitive aspects of typical situations of emotional enactment. It is argued that picking out and interpreting these aspects brings to light reasons for undermining and specifying prima facie ascriptions of positive or negative character. Elaborating on an account of inhibiting conditions therefore allows for denying generalist assumptions in emotion studies (for any enactment of emotion x, x invariably shows the evaluative profile y) without getting into subjectivism or relativism.

Loneliness and the Goods of Friendship

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We argue that loneliness is an awareness of the absence and unattainability of certain goods of friendship: the spectrum of benefits and values that accrue from amicable and intimate relationships with others. The goods of friendship, we argue, range from simple advantages of pleasure and utility, to deeper goods associated with autonomy, identity, and self-determination. To feel lonely, according to the view developed here, is to feel that such goods are missing from one’s life, and/or that they are not easily achieved. Loneliness is thus not a simple species of sadness: it includes a more profound sense of being unable to realise oneself, in collaboration with others.

Happiness as an Affective Evaluation

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The goal of our paper is to put forward a new theory of occurrent happiness, that is, happiness conceived of as an occurrent mental state. We start by showing why the main theories of happiness in the literature are unsatisfactory. Briefly, hedonism (Crisp 2006; Feldman 2010) looks incapable of making sense of the seemingly constitutive connection existing between happiness and states such as tranquillity and peace of mind, which do not appear to be necessarily pleasant. Life satisfactionism (Sumner 1996; Suikkanen 2011) seems to
either miss out on the affective dimension of happiness, when it construes the latter as a cognitive judgement of satisfaction, or to look suspiciously ad hoc, when it construes happiness as a mix of cognitive and affective states. Finally, emotional theories (Haybron 2008; Kauppinen 2015) have troubles explaining what exactly makes emotional states constituents of happiness and what distinguishes them from other affective, yet seemingly non-happiness-constituting, states such as sensory pleasures.

Our own theory is based on two main claims. The first is that occurrent happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of affective states such as emotions, moods, and sensory pleasures. The second is that what these affective states have in common, and what makes them happiness-constituting states, is that they are kinds of ‘felt evaluations’, that is, affective experiences of value. In particular, we argue that emotions, moods, and sensory pleasures are different kinds of perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. In our view, the main difference between emotions and moods is that the former are evaluative perceptions of specific objects ([Author 2]), whereas the latter are evaluative perceptions of undetermined possibilities ([Author 1&2]). For instance, on our account, fear of a bear consists in a perceptual experience of the bear as fearsome. By contrast, irritability consists in a perceptual experience that something or other might happen that is offensive, e.g. being told names by your classmates or being treated with lack of respect at work. As for sensory pleasures, we characterise them as perceptual experiences of a particular evaluative property, i.e. the pleasurable, directed at sensory events. Together, our claims deliver the conclusion that occurrent happiness consists in a broadly positive affective experience of values.

We conclude our paper by illustrating the advantages of our theory over its main competitors and by showing how it can be used to characterise other types of happiness that are often distinguished in the literature, such as dispositional happiness and happiness as a psychological condition.

From cold feet to butterflies: how do we develop Predictive Processing into an account of complex affectivity?

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In this paper, I will criticise Predictive Processing (PP) accounts of emotion by assessing how well they explain the phenomenal qualities of affectual experiences (see Fuchs 2013). With particular attention on mood and emotions, I assess whether accounts of valence can be scaled up to so-called “full-blooded” or “fully fledged” emotions (Kiverstein, Miller and Rietveld 2017, Van de Cruys 2017) from the cognition-emotion integrative account of Miller and Clark (2018), to the rate of error-reduction accounts of Kiverstein et al. (2017) and Van de Cruys (2017). I argue that the latter attempt to glean emotion and mood from an account of more basic affectual experience, valence, is unsuccessful but highlights our need for an account of emotion with a tangible connection to the objects of cognitive prediction. I conclude that emotion cannot be derived from basic building blocks of valence (although mood could be) but I suggest that we could develop an integrative account, using Barrett’s (2017) own theory of constructed emotion and emotion concepts which are grounded in interoception, action and context.

Self-esteem and social esteem

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Psychological evidence and philosophical theorizing have convincingly shown that self-esteem is of fundamental importance to human well-being. Interestingly, the literature usually describes self-esteem as an enduring state relating to a fundamental sense of self-worth, which accompanies the individual from early development and has an impact on his or her moods. Main aim of the present talk is to show that self-esteem also comes in another—within relevant literature rather neglected—episodic form, which depends on the social esteem the subject receives from relevant others. To support this claim, the talk has been organised into three parts. Part 1 distinguishes “state” from “episodic” self-esteem (henceforth “self-esteem” tout court) by describing the latter as an occurrent self-conscious emotion, which possesses (positive or negative) hedonic valence and involves self-evaluation, thereby tracking the values (or disvalues) of the emoting subject. Even if different, I conjecture that these two attitudes are closely related: (just as other emotions) positive self-esteem nurtures and sustains state self-esteem, while eroding it, when negative. Part 2 elaborates on self-esteem by differentiating it from pride. Although the two emotions show noteworthy similarities in their phenomenology and intentional structure, they differ in fundamental respects. Pride is a self-evaluation, which is
fitting when one has striven for, and achieved, the goal she desires—partly regardless of how this achievement is evaluated by others. Self-esteem, too, is a form of self-evaluation, but its condition of fit is fulfilled if the subject is esteemed by others: a subject’s self-esteem is a function of the social esteem received from others. This unveils another important difference. Pride is not essentially comparative (although it can be comparative) meaning that, to elicit pride, one’s achievement needs not be compared with the achievement of others. By contrast, self-esteem is essentially comparative: to elicit self-esteem, the subject must evaluate that the esteem s/he receives is comparatively higher than the esteem others receive. This is a trait self-esteem inherits from social esteem: when one esteems the other, the attitude tracks the values of a subject by assessing them against the background of the values of other subjects.

Part 3 elaborates on this last point to determine the extent of self-esteem’s sociality. I claim that it is not social esteem per se, which generates self-esteem: if the subject believes to attract esteem because of traits/features/achievements that she herself does not value, the received esteem may still be flattering, but won’t elicit self-esteem. To put this differently, the values relevant to the subject’s self-esteem must coincide with the values at stake in social esteem. That is, the parties involved must share the very same values. This indicates that, for self-esteem to get off the ground, the esteemer must be conceived by the esteemed as an in-group member. Insofar as self-esteem presupposes a subjective sense of group-memberships or us-ness, it belongs to the class of ‘hetero-induced self-conscious emotions,’ together with envy and (specific forms of) shame and pride. In these emotions, the subject’s self-assessment depends on others insofar as they are construed as in-group members.

A Plea for The Moral Adequacy of Emotions
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In the interdisciplinary field of emotions, a mostly philosophical consideration is concerned with the adequacy or appropriateness of emotions. When referring to the adequacy of emotions, it is generally agreed upon that there are several different stances according to which one can judge a particular emotion. But, common philosophical approaches on the adequacy of emotions usually focus on the most objective assessment of the situation - whether an emotion fits the facts. In contrast to
this, I claim that this objective stance, generally called ‘fittingness’, does not suffice the current needs of emotional evaluation.

Considering the complex and wide influence emotions have on our social life, especially in terms of their motivational aspect and their influence on a person’s actions, I believe it is unavoidable to consider the moral value of emotions. Of course, there are already concepts questioning the prevalence of fittingness, as well as approaches that analyze the effects emotions have on moral motivation. However, there seems to be no particular interest in a moral judgment of emotional adequacy and a development towards such a moral judgement is missing. In this paper, I provide an approach to the moral adequacy of emotional responses in a social context. I aim to show that in today’s social and political culture, in which right-wing populists, especially in the U.S. and Europe, increasingly gain power by emotionally charging public debates, the link between emotions and moral norms cannot be neglected.

To do so, I will show the importance of the moral judgment of emotions in everyday life and I will then explain how one might properly apply a moral judgment to all emotions. By introducing two instances of judging the moral adequacy, I claim that an emotional reaction can be morally relevant in terms of either its cause or its consequence. On this basis, I will describe how the moral value of an emotional response can be determined. Finally, I aim to show that judging the moral value of an emotion influences the moral self of a person and thereby affects the moral rules she lives by. Accordingly, evaluating the moral adequacy of emotions could facilitate moral growth, not only in individuals but also in whole societies.

Emotional Bonding to Fictional Characters
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In this paper I argue that an emotional response to works of fiction is not only possible but necessary for their thorough comprehension. I suggest two answers to the paradox of fiction in order to explain how it is possible to experience strong emotions although one is aware that fictional characters do not exist. The first is the distinction between a spontaneous emotional reaction and a conscious deliberation. The second is that human beings as persons share a structural similarity with fictional characters namely that we make sense of our own personality in a narrative way.

It is uncontroversial that some emotional responses help us understand a fictional work because they contribute to our desire to continuously engage in it. Feelings of
interest or curiosity help continue reading a book or longing for watching another episode of a series. More controversial is the thesis, that I want to defend, that emotional reactions to fictional characters not only arouse our interest but are crucial for profound comprehension of the fictional works. The central argument here is that an appropriate interpretation of a fictional work requires to reflect on our own emotional responses to its characters, otherwise the interpretation will lack central aspects to fully understand the work of fiction (cf. Robinson 2005). If a character in a novel faces a tragic loss and I fail to feel the sorrow and grief the character is facing, I might be able to give a summary of the plot but my interpretation of the novel will be inappropriate because it will ignore a huge part of it.

Here one needs to answer the famous paradox of fiction, the claim that strong emotional reactions to fictional characters are irrational (cf. Radford 1987). I argue that to successfully deal with the paradox of fiction we need two things. First, we need to distinguish between initial and spontaneous emotional reactions on the one hand and careful and conscious deliberation on the other. While it does not matter for our spontaneous emotional reaction whether the character that we are reacting to is real or fictional, this is important for our cognitive deliberation following the initial reaction. That is why it is perfectly rational to feel deep sorrow for a fictional character while reading a book, although it might not be rational if one fails to master everyday life because of a tragic novel one has read.

Second, to explain how we can be emotionally moved by fictional characters we need to consider our own make-up as persons. I argue that our self-understanding as persons, that can be shaped over time through our convictions, decisions and experiences, depends on some moderate narrative account. Therefore, we share a structural similarity to fictional characters. While this is not to say that there remains no difference between real persons and fictional characters, it helps to understand why it doesn’t matter for our emotional responses if the characters are fictional and how an emotional bonding to them is possible.

References:
While remaining still largely understudied if compared to other aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, the topic of emotions has been in recent years the subject of a growing scholarly interest. On the one hand, this fact signalizes the centrality of the topic of emotions in the contemporary philosophical debate. On the other hand, it has opened new stimulating perspectives on Hegel’s thought. Emotions in Hegel have been investigated prevalently in the Phenomenology of spirit (Pahl) and in the “Anthropology” and “Psychology” sections of the subjective spirit in the third part of the Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (Howard, Russon, Maurer).

These studies have rightly emphasized the fundamental role emotions (both Empfindungen and Gefühle) play in Hegel’s epistemology, philosophy of action, of politics, of history, etc., as opposed, for instance, to Kant’s thought. However, there is another facet to Hegel’s theory of emotions that should always be considered. In his reflection on the role of philosophy in connection with history, knowledge, action, and the other forms of absolute spirit (that is, put short, in his metaphilosophy), Hegel is very careful to deny emotions (including aesthetic and religious ones) any substantial role, as opposed to the “labour” of the concept. This is very clear, among others, in Hegel’s anti-romantic polemic in the Preface to the Phenomenology and in the Encyclopedia’s absolute spirit section.

This “double treatment” seems to complicate both the issue of the “place” of emotions in Hegel’s system and the actualization attempts. As I will argue, however, not only Hegel’s double treatment of emotions is not ambiguous, but it is also highly appealing for contemporary debates. My argument follows a three-step structure. First of all, I will outline the complexity of the place of emotions in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. Secondly, I will connect the discussion of emotions with Hegel’s distinction of the three forms of the absolute spirit, and especially with the “end of art” thesis. Finally, I will argue that Hegel’s theory of emotions reflects central threads of his conception of philosophy, of freedom, and of modernity, in a way that can significantly contribute to our understanding of the same topics.
Within the philosophy of emotions empathy has always had a relevant role. In particular, the concept of empathy and some of those related to it – as for instance the concept of sympathy – have been taken to play a crucial role in ethics at least since the Scottish Enlightenment (Hume 1739; Smith 1774). Despite their many differences, Hume and Smith conceive of sympathy as the principle allowing our moral judgment to emerge and as the source of our moral distinctions. More recently, a revival of moral sentimentalism (e.g. Kauppinen 2014) on the one hand, and empirical research on moral behavior (e.g. Eisenberg 2000; Eisenberg, Strayer 1987) on the other, have prompted a renewed interest on these concepts and on their role in moral reasoning and in moral behavior. Furthermore, empathy has recently entered our public discourse and it has been conceived as having the power to ameliorate our social and political interactions with others (see for instance Obama’s talk of ‘empathy deficit’; see also Rifkin 2009: 42).

In the context of this extensive interest in empathy and in its contribution to moral, social, and political debates, my aim is to investigate the extent to which such a moral role can be actually granted. Before focusing on a positive assessment of empathy’s actual contribution to ethics, I will delve into a few aspects that would show how prudence is recommended when dealing with this issue. More precisely, I will show how an exaggerated reliance on our ordinary concept of empathy could lead to an underestimation of its biases and potential limitations, how a naïve conception of its connection to morality would render extremely complicated to account for specific cases that will function as counterexamples, and how a too broad conceptualization of what empathy actually is runs the risk of entailing forms of reductionism. Overcoming this shortsightedness can pave the way for arguing in favor of an important – though not sufficient and possibly neither necessary – role for empathy in ethics, once empathy is defined in a narrow and fine-grained way.

References (selection)
May we plan to conduct our everyday life without referring to any kind of emotions or passions? Or, more radically, may we suppose that there is a philosophical theory claiming to either eliminate any affections or at least control them thanks to a strong and prescriptively binding use of a form of rationality? Although some ancient philosophical schools of the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic period (especially the Epicureans and Stoics) tried to go in such a direction, hardly anyone would contend or grant that emotions, passions, and affections play a special role in another philosophical movement of that time, namely Pyrrhonism. However, one should avoid endorsing the negative evaluation formulated by some ancient authors (as well as contemporary scholars), who maintain that sceptical thinkers like the Pyrrhonists cannot offer any coherent theory about ethical life and its emotional side, since they are – as underlined by Aristotle (Metaph. IV 4, 1006a14-5) and by Plato (Theaet. 171d) before him – similar to plants which are deprived of good nourishment and therefore paralyzed, because they are incapable of acting according to firm or, better, absolute moral reference points. But do Pyrrhonists really ignore the multifarious, difficult, and complex net of all those passions and emotions that crowd and sometimes influence or change the course of our everyday life? If we carefully analyze Sextus Empiricus’s
rich corpus, this negative impression (or prejudice perhaps) simply disappears, since he indeed examines the ethical role, moral weight, and operative function of emotional attitudes. Accordingly, in some relevant passages on which I shall focus my attention, Sextus considers the passionate elements of our agency in order to show at least two important features of the Pyrrhonian moral stance: 1. the existence and pertinence of a ‘theoretical impassibility’, albeit one limited to the realm of opinions; 2. the plain acceptance of some natural affections, defended against the background of a new idea of behaviouristic and pragmatic dispositions.

Environmentally Scaffolded Emotions
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One need not dig far below the surface to be struck by the fact that the recent debate about ‘situated affectivity’ seems somewhat odd in that it either appears to reinvent the wheel or else indulge in metaphysical intricacies such as the coupling-constitution debate that will hardly resonate with those familiar with the topic, in particular from a more phenomenological point of view. Leaving the coupling-constitution debate with its futile quarrels about whether affectivity is properly extended or merely embedded behind, and also taking it for granted that affectivity is embodied, we take a fresh look at human affectivity beyond brain and body. We will elaborate on two different, albeit interconnected, ways in which our affective life is essentially a matter of our (more or less intimate) coupling with our (natural, technological, and social) environment. Thus, we focus on couplings which originate with the individual and from there stretch out into the environment through a (mostly intentional) process of resource usage. In the final section, we then focus on couplings which originate with structures in the environment and from there reach inwards into the individual through a process of (intentional or unintentional) mind invasion.

Religious Zeal as a Theologico-Political Affect
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My talk provides a philosophical of the phenomenon of religious as a theologico-political affect. Besides patriotic zeal, religious zeal is the most prominent form of
political zeal in today’s world—at least if we follow public opinion. It is commonly associated with religiously motivated and/or justified violence, i.e. violence perceived as fulfilment of a religious duty and/or committed to achieve a religious objective (Murphy 2011). As such, religious zeal is supposed to motivate, be partly constitutive of, and/or synonymous with, religious fanaticism. Since religious fanaticism constitutes a pressing problem in today’s world, understanding the nature of religious zeal is not only of theoretical, but also of practical value. Yet, despite its alleged significance and topicality, there is a striking lack of general philosophical theories of (religious) zeal. Particularly, though zeal commonly is characterized as “passionate commitment” (Toscano 2017) or “ardent devotion” (Olson 2007), and associated with emotions such as hatred and anger, but also love and compassion, the exact nature of zeal as an affective phenomenon remains unclear. In providing an analysis of the phenomenon of religious zeal, my paper aims at contributing to filling this gap.

My analysis focuses on two questions: What kind of affective phenomenon is religious zeal, and how does it relate to politics? I argue that religious zeal is a passionate, wholehearted and unconditional commitment to a religious object or idea to which we attribute ultimate significance. It can take both the form of an emotion and of a passion. Emotional zeal characteristically is directed at specific objects in the world and consists of an affective evaluation that sanctions the violation of a religious law. As such, it belongs to the anger family of emotions (Kauppinen 2018). Passionate zeal is directed at transcendent objects or idea such as God (Sloterdijk 2009; Assmann 2016). As a passion, it is an affective attachment to the religious object or idea in question that is characteristic of the person and bestows her life with continuity, coherence, and/or meaning (Roberts 2007). It becomes political, if it claims to be valid not only for a certain domain of life but rather for life as such, and not only for an individual person or a group of chosen people but rather for everyone. It can but need not be violent. But religious zeal cannot only take the form of an emotion or a passion, it also can be presented and interpreted as such. Though the ascription of religious zeal paradigmatically serves a discrediting function, the concept is also used as a positive self-description (Edwards 2009; Hengel 1989; Olson 2007). Moreover, zealotry is used as a political strategy to mobilize friends, and to force moderates to take sides in a dichotomic struggle (Olson 2007, 2011; Wright-Neville and Smith 2009). It may but need not be undemocratical. As I argue, all in all, religious zeal is a much more ambiguous phenomenon than the pejorative and disambiguating use of the term in public discourse suggests.
Is Doubt an Emotion?
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Doubt is neither disbelief, nor suspension of judgment. Doubt is an occurrent mental state, not merely a disposition reflecting a certain degree of belief. As H. H. Price puts it: “Doubt is something which we feel, or at any rate it is something which we experience or ‘live through’” (Price, 1969, p. 285).

It has been recently proposed that doubting amounts to believing that non-p is possible (Moon, 2018). I argue that such a view is unable to capture the important phenomenological dimension of everyday doubt. Additionally, believing that non-p is possible does not commit oneself to being motivated to inquire or gain epistemic content. Following Pierce (1877, IV), I believe that a proper account of doubt should say something both about the phenomenology of doubt, and about its motivational aspect. Everyday doubt is felt; it is a state which truly presents a proposition as demanding our attention.

In this paper, I propose that the architecture of doubt involves a specific emotion that mediates the deployment of the effortful cognitive strategies we use when we inquire. Indeed, I claim that the state of doubt might be best conceived as an emotional reaction to certain pieces of evidence, which triggers a desire to acquire epistemic content through inquiry. In most agents, this system results in an adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters, that is about propositions which are epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities. How could an emotion be related to our disposition to doubt? Emotions - and more generally affect - guide choice, and especially risk-perceptions (Slovic & Peters, 2006). Certain emotions and moods like fear and anxiety even have the specific function of rendering the dangers and risks in our environment salient. In particular, a disposition towards the emotion of anxiety is thought to underlie individual differences in the tendency to avoid risky decisions (Maner et al. 2006). What is anxiety? Anxiety is felt towards dangers or threats which are not immediately present, but could materialize in nearby possible worlds or in the future. We can feel anxiety because we are able to project ourselves into possible scenarios and anticipate how events could unfold. In the case of anxiety, attention is focused specifically on ways in which negative or harmful possibilities could materialize.

I want to suggest here that, in virtue of the type of objects anxiety tracks, this emotion might play a central role in the fact that our belief formation (and revision) processes are sensitive to our practical concerns and our motivation to avoid costly errors. That
our everyday doubts are underscored by an emotion which tracks propositions expressing harmful possibilities ensures that we engage in the cognitively costly process of doubting and inquiring only when it matters, pragmatically speaking. I hence claim that most of the doubts we engage in as part of our everyday life, and which are tied to our practical interests, are motivated by a moderate, healthy amount of anxiety.

Falling in love with machines?
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Is it possible to establish romantic relationships with computer programs or synthetic androids? Can technological alterities become partners of human romantic affairs? In order to answer these questions, we need to know what would change in human experience of love if it were directed towards an artificial being. But first we would need to describe human experience of love from the point of view of how it is experienced, and to outline the necessary conditions that make this experience possible.

In my paper I will attempt a phenomenological description of love experience. This done, we can look at what would happen if the partner of human romantic relationship were an artificial being. Would it still be possible to experience something like love towards it, or in what sense would the experience of love alter as a result of involving technological alterity?

Experiencing love is obviously a very complex phenomenon, consisting of attitudes, thoughts, emotions, acts and patterns of behavior, their sedimentations, etc. However, in the purposes of our analysis we can look only at the constitution of the object of love from the phenomenological point of view. First we can ask ourselves what is precisely that we are in love with when we experience it towards a real human being? Is it his or her psycho-physical entity, the “lived body” (Merleau-Ponty), the gestures of which we are observing and the messages issued by whom we attend to? Or is it our partner’s “inner” response to our love; his or her “inner” loving attitude?

The most obvious objection to making technological alterities partners of our intimate relations consists exactly in its lack of real “inner life”, or life as such, at least in the biological sense of the term. Considering how easily we are deceived by a pretending human lover, however, we have to conclude that the inner attitude remains hidden even in cases of human alterities. The other’s attitude towards us is always constituted
indirectly, always by the help of belief and imagination. Or, to put in terms of phenomenological analysis: by means of the “empty intentions”. Thus the absence of “inner loving attitude” might not be an obstacle in making technological alterities our partners of love.

Habitual affectivity: A socio-critical approach to emotions’ epistemic relevance

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Accounts dealing with the epistemic relevance of emotions usually abstract from the socio-cultural embeddedness of the feeling person. In order to explore how a concrete instantiation of affective intentionality in a specific, concrete socio-cultural context contributes positively or negatively to the aim of understanding, I argue we must take into account the habitual dimension of an emotion. A person acquires a specific “emotion repertoire” in the course of her individual affective biography, which in turn inevitably takes place in a specific socio-cultural context. By considering these habituated “orders of feeling” that pre-structure the ways in which a person apprehends the world affectively, I reveal several ways in which emotions are epistemically relevant that cannot be seen by abstracting from such a “multi-dimensional situated perspective of affective intentionality”: Understanding processes might be flawed because i) the individual “affectively attaches” specifically to such orders of feeling that allow her to sustain “cherished practices” (Stanley) and ii) because the habituated affect forecloses alternative ways of apprehending due to being “ankylosed” (Fanon) and, thus, restricted. Revealing how emotions might be problematic in understanding processes shows the need to, and makes it possible, to think differently about what is required, epistemically, in order to overcome these flaws: Emotions might also be exactly what is needed in order to overcome the problematic “orders of feeling” by disrupting the habitual way of apprehending the world, thus allowing for transformation of the emotional repertoire. By considering emotions as both synchronously and diachronically socio-culturally situated phenomena, we come to see being affectively “disruptable” and the cultivation of rich and adaptable emotional repertoires as crucial epistemic abilities.
It is often thought that forgiveness plays a significant role in processes of political reconciliation. I shall argue - drawing on some earlier work in which I have argued that punishment can play a significant role in political reconciliation - that we should not give forgiveness a central role here. But this leaves us with a puzzle about the role of apologies in political reconciliation. For it is natural to think that public apologies can play a significant role in promoting reconciliation. However, it is natural to see apologies as involving a request for forgiveness, and it is, at least initially somewhat difficult to see how this could be so if forgiveness plays no significant role here.

I shall argue that public apologies, can be an important way of expressing what I have elsewhere called – following Darell Moellendorf – political regret, and that their role in doing so need not depend on their having forgiveness as a constitutive goal. I shall proceed as follows. First I shall discuss the notion of reconciliation. Then I shall argue that we should not see political reconciliation as being simply a matter of personal reconciliation writ large. It involves both more and less than individuals being reconciled with one another. I shall then argue that political reconciliation does not – or need not – involve group forgiveness either. Finally, I shall turn to the question of apology.

Surprise is a particular emotion. By some it is listed among neglected emotions and typically it is not among basic emotions. On the other hand some wonder if it is an emotion at all, given that it is not valenced or not valenced in a stable way insofar as surprise is pleasant in some cases and unpleasant in others.

I want to argue that surprise has a special status which is to precede other emotions and to happen when the situation is cognitively vague. For instance, if I am abandoned by a friend I am sad. Yet if I realize that what I have considered to be abandonment is not an abandonment I stop being sad. This is why if I intend to adopt generally an in-depth approach to the world I rarely may engage in any feeling as long as I don’t have
a sufficient knowledge about the world or the particular fact, event or person who is the object of my affectivity. And it is rare that I acquire a complete information about a fact, an event or a person. However, since it is hard to stop feeling at all I feel surprise. As such it expresses a kind of mature affectivity because it eliminates a vacillation of feelings from one to its opposite resulting from too quick a judgment which then turns out to be erroneous. Surprise is a kind of affective bracketing of what-happens-to-me. This is an affective I don't know yet. This explains (i) why surprise is not valenced, and (ii) why surprise is easily and/or quickly translated into I don't know what I feel or I don't know what I should feel.